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Resumo
O presente artigo busca refletir sobre o Impedimento do Presidente da 
República, particularmente a partir da análise de um caso pertencente a tra-
dição Constitucional relativamente parecida com a nossa, qual seja, o caso 
Sul-Coreano, de 2004. Neste caso a Corte Constitucional Sul-Coreana res-
tabeleceu o Presidente ao cargo, após a suspensão de suas funções determi-
nado pelo Congresso. Diferenças entre as estruturas Constitucionais jogam 
luzes sobre os limites deste instituto, inclusive com lições valiosas para o 
Direito pátrio.
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AbstRAct
This article aims to reflect about the Presidential Impeachment, particu-
larly from the analysis of  a judicial case that is closely to our tradition, i.e., 
the South-Korean case (2004). In this case, the South Korean Constitutional 
Court restored the President to his office, after the suspension determined 
by the Congress. Some differences between the Constitutional structures 
throw some light on the limits of  the institute, bringing valuable lessons for 
the Brazilian law. 
Keywords: Impeachment; Presidentialism; South-Korean case (2004).
1. IntRodução
Muito já se escreveu sobre o impedimento presidencial1, no Brasil e no 
exterior, devendo ser citado o clássico e incontornável livro do falecido juris-
1  Neste artigo usaremos indistintamente as expressões “Impedimento” e “Impeachment”.
* Segue anexo a este artigo o inteiro teor do 
acórdão da Corte Constitucional Sul-Coreana 
no caso do Impeachment do Presidente Roh 
Moo-hyun (caso: 2004Hun-Na1, KCCR: 16-1 
KCCR 609).
** Doutorando em Direito no Centro Uni-
versitário de Brasília. Email: tsapadua@gmail.
com
*** Doutor e Mestre em Direito das Relações 
Sociais (PUC-SP). Professor da graduação e do 
Programa de Mestrado e Doutorado do Uni-
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ta Paulo Brossard2, e sua manifestação jornalística após 
o impedimento de Fernando Collor3; sobre este fato, re-
corde-se ainda o fato de que durante o impedimento do 
Presidente Fernando Collor, houve a judicialização de 
inúmeros aspectos constitucionais relativos ao instituto.
Nossa historiografia registra que, na referida época, 
o programa Roda Viva, da TV Cultura, realizou trans-
missão especial e diferente de sua performance tradicio-
nal em que, via de regra, um convidado fica no centro 
do estúdio e os vários convidados o circundam. Neste 
programa, no entanto, observou-se a presença da ré-
plica da cadeira presidencial, ao centro e praticamente 
vazia, exceto pela faixa presidencial dependurada na ca-
deira, com um debate aberto entre os convidados, pois 
a temática já estava estabelecida: era um mote.4
Tão drástica a medida, que o impedimento é com-
parado à morte, embora – e, não obstante, a comenta-
rista política (republicana e conservadora) Ann Coulter 
tenha sido execrada quando sugeriu em 1998 que, uma 
vez confirmado o fato de que Bill Clinton tivesse menti-
do sob juramento acerca dos famosos casos Paula Jones 
e Monica Lewinsky5, a solução comportaria uma dupla 
2  BROSSARD, Paulo. O impeachment: aspectos da responsabi-
lidade política do presidente da república. São Paulo: Saraiva, 1992.
3  Embora tenha renunciado no dia em que o Senado julgava seu 
Impeachment, consideramos efeito decorrente, com efeito idên-
tico de vacância do cargo. A propósito, recordando e perquirindo 
sobre a atualidade de sua tese acadêmica, escrita originalmente em 
1964, Paulo Brossard observou que: “A conclusão da minha tese não 
era original, dado que a generalidade dos publicistas, desde o fim 
do século passado, concluía que o impeachment, com o correr do 
tempo, se tornara antiquado e inadequado processo de apuração da 
responsabilidade presidencial, alguma coisa como roupa de menino 
em corpo adulto, ou como couraça da cavalaria medieval em tem-
pos de armas atômicas; uma velharia a ser recolhida ao museu das 
antiguidades constitucionais”. Cfr. BROSSARD, Paulo. Depois do 
impeachment. Correio Braziliense de 6 de janeiro de 1993, p. 13.
4  Levado ao ar pela TV Cultura em setembro de 1992, um dia 
antes de a Câmara dos Deputados aprovar o afastamento do presi-
dente Fernando Collor, o programa contou com a apresentação 
de Marco Antônio Rocha, e com os convidados os juristas Celso 
Antônio Bandeira de Mello e Miguel Reale Jr., o jornalista Millor 
Fernandes, o empresário Ricardo Semler, a escritora Lygia Fagundes 
Telles, o economista João Sayad, o então estudante e presidente da 
UNE Lindbergh Farias, o então operário Vicente Paulo da Silva (o 
dirigente sindical Vicentinho). 
5  Paula Jones, então servidora estadual do Arkansas, processou o 
presidente Bill Clinton por assédio sexual (quando à época era Gov-
ernador daquele Estado, em 1991), e foi durante o seu julgamento 
que houve o desdobramento do surgimento de outros casos de as-
sédio, como o de Monica Lewinsky, pois durante o processo judicial 
os advogados de Paula buscaram demonstrar que havia um padrão 
de conduta, e o então presidente testemunhou sob juramento, ne-
gando os fatos, mas não contava com o aparecimento de um vestido 
saída: impedimento ou assassinato.6
Contudo, a imagem do impedimento como alterna-
tiva ao assassinato foi utilizada por Benjamin Franklin, 
em discurso de 20 de julho de 1787 durante a Convenção 
da Filadélfia, e tal questão é reconhecida academicamente 
como significativa do fato de que a Constituição mantém 
uma vinculação permanente entre o assassinato e o impe-
dimento, na exata medida em que o assassinato também 
impede a continuação da atividade presidencial, abrindo 
ensancha para a substituição do presidente.7
Em termos gerais, é como se uma imagem (impe-
dimento) substituísse a outra (assassinato), nos permi-
tindo trazer a lume a figura do iconoclash, a partir das 
reflexões de Bruno Latour, que em 2002 participou de 
uma provocante exposição: “iconoclash”, “Beyond the Image 
Wars in Science, Religion and Art”, realizada no Center for 
New Art and Media, em Karlsruhe8, a famosa sede do 
Bundesverfassungsgericht, o Tribunal Federal Constitucional 
da Alemanha9. 
A curadoria da exposição reuniu três ambientes: 1) 
Religião, 2) Ciência, e, 3) Arte Contemporânea, pois as 
imagens vinham se apresentando como espécies de “ar-
mas culturais” através das quais ocorreria uma luta am-
bígua, em termos de produção e destruição de imagens, 
emblemas e ícones.
Escolheu-se o termo “iconoclash” (icon = ‘ícone’, clash 
= ‘choque’), significando um “embate de ícones, emble-
mas ou imagens”, para definição da temática da expo-
sição, de modo a permitir a reflexão sobre uma espécie 
de “arqueologia” do ódio e do fanatismo que permeia 
os diversos níveis da vida cultural, social e política. Com 
efeito, dirigindo-se a um tipo de “iconofilia”, além das 
guerras de imagens, acaba-se por sugerir a suspensão 
que continha traços de seu sêmen. Registre-se a decisão da Suprema 
Corte Americana no caso “Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997)”.
6  COULTER, Ann H. High Crimes and Misdemeanors: The 
Case against Bill Clinton. Washington, DC: Regnery, 1998, p. 107.
7  CHAFETZ, Josh. Impeachment and Assassination. Minnesota 
Law Review, vol. 95, 2010, p. 421.
8  LATOUR, Bruno. O que é Iconoclash? Ou, há um mundo 
além das guerras de imagem? Horizontes Antropológicos, Porto 
Alegre, ano 14, n. 29, p. 111-150, jan./jun. 2008.
9  Os curadores foram: Peter Galison, Dario Gamboni, Joseph 
Leo Koerner, Bruno Latour, Adam Lowe, Hans Ulrich Obrist, Peter 
Weibel. Informações relevantes e adicionais podem ser encontra-
das em dois sites específicos; Iconoclash: Beyond the Image-Wars in Sci-
ence, Religion and Art: <http://www.bruno-latour.fr/node/338>; e, 
Iconoclash: Beyond the Image Wars in Science, Religion and Art: <http://
hosting.zkm.de/icon/stories/storyReader$3>, acesso à ambos em 
10.11.2015.
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do gestual iconoclasta, em favor de uma “cascata de 
imagens em transformação”, evitando se ater de ma-
neira obsessiva a imagens congeladas e fixas “fora de 
seu fluxo10.
De modo geral, “iconoclasmo” é termo significante 
de que “sabemos o que está acontecendo no ato de quebrar, e 
quais são as motivações para o que se apresenta como um cla-
ro projeto de destruição”. Por sua vez, o “iconoclash” ocor-
re “quando não se sabe, quando se hesita, quando se é 
perturbado por uma ação para a qual não há maneira de 
saber, sem uma investigação maior, se é destrutiva ou 
construtiva”11. Pergunta-se: “por que as imagens provo-
cam tanta paixão?” A resposta não é simples, e invoca 
reflexões sofisticadas. Invoquemos Alberto Manguel, 
que menciona: 
As imagens que formam o nosso mundo são 
símbolos, sinais, mensagens e alegorias. Ou talvez 
sejam apenas presenças vazias que completamos 
com o nosso desejo, experiência, questionamento 
e remorso. Qualquer que seja o caso, as imagens, 
assim como as palavras, são a matéria de que somos 
feitos.12
O mesmo autor nos recorda que quando “lemos 
imagens” acabamos por atribuir a elas o caráter tem-
poral da narrativa, ampliando o que é limitado por uma 
moldura para um “antes” e um “depois”, e através da 
arte de narrar histórias (de amor ou de ódio), também 
conferimos a imagem imutável uma vida infinita e ines-
gotável13.
Dialogando com o ideário de André Malraux, Alber-
to Manguel recorda que ao situarmos uma obra de arte 
entre outras obras, criadas antes e depois dela, estaría-
mos em condições de ouvir, em primeira mão, o “canto 
da metamorfose”, ou seja, o diálogo que as obras tra-
vam entre si, e o acervo de imagens que vai se formando 
no patrimônio do espectador seria chamado de “museu 
imaginário”14.
10  LATOUR, Bruno. O que é Iconoclash? Ou, há um mundo 
além das guerras de imagem? Horizontes Antropológicos, Porto 
Alegre, ano 14, n. 29, p. 111-150, jan./jun. 2008, p. 112.
11  LATOUR, Bruno. O que é Iconoclash? Ou, há um mundo 
além das guerras de imagem? Horizontes Antropológicos, Porto 
Alegre, ano 14, n. 29, p. 111-150, jan./jun. 2008, p. 113.
12  MANGUEL, Alberto. Lendo imagens: uma história de 
amor e ódio. Trad. Rubens Figueiredo, Rosaura Eichemberg e Cláu-
dia Strauch. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2001, p. 21.
13  MANGUEL, Alberto. Lendo imagens: uma história de 
amor e ódio. Trad. Rubens Figueiredo, Rosaura Eichemberg e Cláu-
dia Strauch. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2001, p. 27.
14  MANGUEL, Alberto. Lendo imagens: uma história de 
amor e ódio. Trad. Rubens Figueiredo, Rosaura Eichemberg e Cláu-
É dentro deste espírito reflexivo que Mônica Sette 
Lopes, na introdução do livro que congrega artigos de 
alunos e professores integrantes de um grupo de pes-
quisa sobre a evolução e a metodologia da experiência 
jurídica, do qual foi organizadora, justifica de maneira 
bastante curiosa a escolha da imagem da capa do refe-
rido livro, qual seja, a pintura de Pablo Picasso denomi-
nada “A Suplicante”, vinculada ao desespero, a dor e à 
angústia.15
Com efeito, certamente influenciado pela brutali-
dade das imagens, e sobre os efeitos delas decorrentes, 
Bruno Latour busca escavar a origem de uma distinção 
absoluta entre “verdade” e “falsidade”, vale dizer, a di-
ferença entre “um mundo puro”, que seria esvaziado 
de intermediários criados pelo homem, e “um mundo 
impuro”, repulsivo e repleto de mediadores feitos pelos 
homens, embora fascinantes. Duas seriam as posições: 
1ª) Sem intermediários, seria mais puro – e mais “rápi-
do” o acesso à verdade, à natureza e à ciência. 2ª) Com 
intermediários, as imagens às quais não se prescinde, 
seriam a única maneira de se ter acesso à verdade, à na-
tureza e à ciência16.
A referida construção advém do famoso “jogo de 
palavras” de Marie-José Mondzain: “A verdade é ima-
gem, mas não existe uma imagem da verdade”, num 
dilema que se procura compreender, documentar e 
eventualmente, quem sabe, superar. Provoca-se, uma 
vez mais:
O que aconteceu, que tornou as imagens (e por 
imagens queremos dizer qualquer signo, obra de 
arte, inscrição ou figura que atua como mediação 
para acessar alguma outra coisa) o foco de tanta 
paixão? A ponto de destruí-las, apaga-las, desfigura-
las se ter tornado a pedra de toque para provar 
a validade da fé, da ciência, da perspicácia, da 
criatividade artística de alguém? A ponto de que ser 
iconoclasta parece ser a mais alta virtude, a mais alta 
piedade em círculos intelectuais?
dia Strauch. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2001, p. 27-28.
15  Afirma-se: “Trata-se de uma pequena pintura dependurada e 
quase escondida numa das paredes do Museu Picasso em Paris. No 
entanto, ela revela o desespero, a dor, a angústia da experiência do 
conflito, com traços que marcam o modo de sentir de um tempo e 
as possibilidades amplas da expressão da liberdade humana”. Cfr. 
SETTE LOPES, Mônica. Introdução, in: SETTE LOPES, Mônica 
(Org.). O direito e a ciência: tempos e métodos. Belo Horizonte: 
Movimento Editorial da Faculdade de Direito da UFMG, 2006, p. 
13.
16  LATOUR, Bruno. O que é Iconoclash? Ou, há um mundo 
além das guerras de imagem? Horizontes Antropológicos, Porto 
Alegre, ano 14, n. 29, p. 111-150, jan./jun. 2008, p. 114.
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Há nisso tudo, entretanto, um paradoxo curioso. É 
que os “destruidores de imagens”, verdadeiros “teoclas-
tas”, “iconoclastas”, “ideoclastas”17, acabam por gerar igual-
mente uma espantosa quantidade de “novas imagens” 
compostas de “ícones frescos” e de “mediadores reju-
venescidos”, com “ideias mais fortes” e “ídolos mais 
poderosos”18. São por estas razões que, transitando da 
noção de assassinato, o impedimento presidencial man-
tém a sua verve dramática da undécima hora, e talvez 
até mesmo mais complexa, porque invoca ritual especí-
fico e não ameno, levado a cabo por novos mediadores. 
Não nos toca realizar abordagem que recorde nosso 
passado19, ou nosso presente20, embora reconheçamos 
que tal esforço constitui tentativa vã, ao pretender que 
tais memórias não sejam pontualmente refletidas no 
espelho argumentativo deste artigo. No entanto, pro-
curaremos analisar um caso da experiência estrangeira 
relativamente recente: o caso Sul-Coreano de 2004, com 
vistas a observar algumas questões pontuais relativas ao 
impedimento presidencial.
Poderíamos ter analisado a decisão da Suprema 
Corte das Filipinas21, que em 2003 não apenas invali-
17   Veja-se que o autor de “Jamais Fomos Modernos” menciona 
em entrevista sobre vários e distintos nomes para descrever coisas 
antigas, ou a mesma coisa: “O colóquio se chamou ‘Os mil nomes 
de Gaia’. Por que é importante discutir o nome ou um novo nome 
para Gaia? Gaia é um termo repensado por James Lovelock, que 
tem sido usado por militantes, ativistas, mas quando há muitos no-
mes para algo, é importante discutir. Acho bom usá-lo, porque falar 
em Gaia nos obriga a pensar sobre o que é Gaia e sobre o que é a 
Terra. Quando se fala em gaiapolítica, assim como se fala em geo-
política, as pessoas param e se perguntam: ‘o que é isso?’ Hoje, fazer 
as pessoas pensarem e se perguntarem algo é um grande feito”. LA-
TOUR, Bruno. Entrevista [O Globo]. Bruno Latour, antropólogo 
e escritor: ‘Temos que reconstruir nossa sensibilidade’, por Luiz 
Felipe Reis, em 29.09.2014. Disponível em: <http://oglobo.globo.
com/sociedade/conte-algo-que-nao-sei/bruno-latour-antropolo-
go-escritortemos-que-reconstruir-nossa-sensibilidade-14081447>, 
acesso em 10.11.2015.
18  LATOUR, Bruno. O que é Iconoclash? Ou, há um mundo 
além das guerras de imagem? Horizontes Antropológicos, Porto 
Alegre, ano 14, n. 29, p. 111-150, jan./jun. 2008, p. 114.
19  Sem recuar para além do marco temporal anterior à Constitu-
ição Federal de 1988, recorde-se dos famosos casos de judicialização 
do Impedimento de Fernando Collor de Mello: Os Mandados de 
Segurança nos. 20.941, 21.564, 21.623 e 21.689, de 1992.
20  Por obviedade, estamos nos referindo aos casos de judiciali-
zação do impeachment da atual Presidente da República, através 
MS 33.837, Rel. min. Teori Zavascki, decisão monocrática de 
12.10.2015, e MS 33.838, rel. minª. Rosa Weber, decisão monocrática 
de 13.10.2015.
21  Caso “Francisco, Jr. v. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manana-
nggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc. 415 SCRA 44, at 
105 (2003)”, disponível em: <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurispru-
dou por meio de decisão judicial a segunda tentativa de 
impeachment contra o então Presidente do Tribunal, 
Hilario Davide22, como também anulou vários aspectos 
da seção das regras procedimentais do processo de im-
pedimento, mas devido a extensão do presente artigo, 
optou-se por trabalhar apenas com relação a decisão 
da Corte Constitucional da Coréia do Sul, não obstante 
seja muito importante e interessante sob vários aspectos 
a decisão Filipina.
A escolha deste caso se deu de maneira relativamente 
consciente e não aleatória. A partir de sua reflexão, ob-
servaremos como a Corte Constitucional da Coreia do 
Sul, inspirada no modelo alemão, e similar ao modelo 
italiano, implementou termos jurídico-constitucionais 
de modo a discutir o mérito da judicialização, e mais do 
que isso, ousou enfrentar o Congresso e manter o então 
Presidente da República no cargo, a despeito da vontade 
contrária do legislativo. É possível que nos deparemos 
com questões que à primeira vista possam parecer in-
conciliáveis com nossa tradição constitucional, mas as 
aparências podem enganar. Recordemos um destacado 
pensador como forma de inspiração.
Quando Owenn Fiss escreveu suas memórias sobre 
o jurista argentino Carlos Nino, fez questão de observar 
que este último era um pensador que adorava discutir 
ideias (grandes, abstratas, profundas, algumas até mes-
mo estranhas, mas acima de tudo amava discutir ideias). 
Observou, ainda, que aquele pensador não foi o primei-
ro filósofo a albergar proposições contraditórias em sua 
carreira, mas como um dos melhores, ele abertamente 
confrontou tais contradições e tentou conciliá-las.23
Sem o mesmo brilho, no entanto, é exatamente o que 
tentaremos realizar brevemente neste artigo, vale dizer, 
dence/2003/nov2003/160261.htm>, acesso em 11.11.2015.
22  LARCINA, Franco Aristotle G. Judicial Review of  Impeach-
ment: the Judicialization of  Philippine Politics. Ust law review, vol. 
L, ay 2005–2006.
23  As recordações de Owen Fiss se referem a uma viagem que um 
pequeno grupo de filósofos e juristas americanos e ingleses (Owen 
Fiss, Ronald Dworkin, Thomas Nagel, Thomas Scanlon, e Bernard 
Williams) fizeram até à Argentina em 1985, a convite do governo do 
então recém-eleito Raul Alfonsín, de quem Carlos Nino era o consel-
heiro presidencial, para acompanhar o julgamento da junta militar en-
volvida nos crimes da ditadura, relativos à morte, ao desaparecimento 
e a tortura de aproximadamente 9 mil cidadãos argentinos, embora 
Ronald Dworkin tenha aludido ao relatório “nunca mais”, como uma 
crônica desde o inferno, a mais de 12 mil vítimas. Cfr. FISS, Owen. 
The Death of  a Public Intellectual. The Yale Law Journal, vol. 104, 
1995, p. 1187; DWORKIN, Ronald. Crónica desde el Infierno. Re-
vista Argentina de Teoria Jurídica, vol. 9, nov., 2008.
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tentar conciliar ideias aparentemente contraditórias re-
lativas aos limites do impeachment, no que se refere as 
disposições constitucionais e eventuais limitações para 
apreciação judicial da matéria. Costuma-se apontar o 
fato de que questões “interna corporis”, albergadas pela 
construção do ideário da “doutrina das questões polí-
ticas” tornariam limitada a judicialização de questões 
envolvendo pedido de impedimento presidencial.24
No entanto, o artigo 5º, inciso XXXV da Consti-
tuição Federal parece indicar que não há matéria que 
não possa ser judicializada, e o postulado do devido 
processo legal e da proporcionalidade indicam que não 
podemos interpretar a Constituição brasileira de 1988 à 
luz da constituição americana de 1787. A grande ques-
tão a ser refletida relaciona-se à violação à separação 
dos poderes, eventualmente representativa de matéria 
a ser suscitada em casos como o que ora se vislumbra. 
Diferentemente do que pode parecer, não iremos tratar 
do caso específico dos vários pedidos de impeachment 
e seus desdobramentos judiciais da atual Presidente da 
República. Refletiremos sobre a temática a partir de 
caso distinto, dentro da perspectiva fático-jurídica sobre 
o impedimento.
2. cAso sul coReAno
Roh Moo-hyun, um defensor dos direitos humanos, 
mas sem formação acadêmica, foi eleito presidente da 
Coréia do Sul, através de eleição direta, para um man-
dato de 5 anos em dezembro de 2002. Tendo elaborado 
uma agenda progressista, obteve enormes dificuldades 
opostas por parte do grupo político conservador rival, o 
GNP - Grande Partido Nacional, que possuía a maioria 
no Congresso.25
24  Em um denso estudo sobre a “doutrina das questões políticas”, 
e sua evolução perante o Supremo Tribunal Federal, José Elaeres 
Teixeira observa a inequívoca influência americana (political questions 
doctrine), que inicialmente significavam que em determinados casos 
os Tribunais não teriam nenhuma competência, e deveriam aceitar 
como definitivas as decisões políticas do governo, sendo atribuída 
sua autoria a John Marshall no famoso caso Marbury v. Madson, 
de 1803. Cfr. TEIXEIRA, José Elaeres Marques. A Doutrina das 
Questões Políticas no Supremo Tribunal Federal. Porto Alegre: 
Sérgio Antonio Fabris, 2005, p. 25; 235.
25  LEE, Youngjae. Law, Politics, and Impeachment: The Im-
peachment of  Roh Moo-hyun from a Comparative Constitutional 
Perspective. The American Journal of  Comparative Law, Vol. 
53, 2005. 
A seu turno, o partido do presidente eleito (Partido 
Democrático Milenar), em minoria, enfrentava também 
uma divisão interna, entre apoiadores do antigo líder 
e seus opositores. A situação ficou ainda pior quando 
no final do ano de 2003, alguns de seus aliados foram 
presos acusados de receber contribuições de campanha 
ilegais, deixando-o em meio a uma crise política e com 
poucos apoiadores no Congresso. Nas eleições parla-
mentares subsequentes, o apoio que o presidente con-
cedeu a alguns candidatos do Partido Uri, recém-criado 
(e no qual o presidente iria ingressar algum tempo de-
pois26) foi respondido com uma moção de impedimen-
to, alegando que o Presidente eleito havia violado as 
regras eleitorais de neutralidade.27
Entre março e maio de 2004, a Coreia do Sul expe-
rimentou conturbados momentos políticos decorrentes 
de um processo de impedimento, tentado pela primeira 
vez na sua história. Inicialmente, a Assembleia Nacional 
Sul Coreana aprovou moção de impedimento em face do 
Presidente Roh Moo-hyun. A dinâmica se deu da seguinte 
maneira: após a aprovação do pedido, com a suspensão 
imediata do presidente de suas funções, o Primeiro Mi-
nistro assumiu temporariamente a presidência, quando a 
Corte Constitucional daquele país colocou um ponto fi-
nal na discussão ao decidir pela inadequação do pedido 
de Impedimento, restabelecendo o Presidente em suas 
funções. Segundo se observou à época, cerca de 84% da 
população Sul-Coreana teria aprovado a decisão da Corte 
Constitucional28, havendo um duplo sentimento da popu-
lação: enquanto desaprovavam a política do presidente, 
achavam o impeachment impróprio e também temiam 
pelo próprio processo democrático do país.29
26  Conforme observado, na realidade o Presidente resolveu criar 
o Partido Uri, juntamente com 47 de seus mais fiéis apoiadores, em 
sua maioria advindos do Partido Novo Milênio, assim como o presi-
dente. Algumas outras questões históricas são dignas de nota, como 
o fato de o presidente  Roh Moo-hyun ter tentado uma reconciliação 
com a Coréia do Norte, bem como ter tentado remover as bases 
Americanas de Seul, enfurecendo os conservadores, não menos do 
que sua decisão de enviar tropas ao Iraque e a assinatura do tratado 
de livre comércio com o Chile. Cfr. CHAIBONG, Hahm. South 
Korea’s Miraculous Democracy. Journal of  Democracy, vol. 19, 
n. 3, 2008, p. 137.
27  LEE, Youngjae. Law, Politics, and Impeachment: The Im-
peachment of  Roh Moo-hyun from a Comparative Constitutional 
Perspective. The American Journal of  Comparative Law, Vol. 
53, 2005. 
28  LEE, Youngjae. Law, Politics, and Impeachment: The Im-
peachment of  Roh Moo-hyun from a Comparative Constitutional 
Perspective. The American Journal of  Comparative Law, Vol. 
53, 2005. 
29  CHAIBONG, Hahm. South Korea’s Miraculous Democracy. 
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Em termos gerais, a decisão da Corte Constitucional 
foi baseada numa espécie de inafastabilidade do contro-
le constitucional sobre o impedimento. Se por um lado 
o artigo 65 da Constituição Sul-Coreana30 estabelece 
que compete à Assembleia Nacional, representativa do 
Poder Legislativo, suspender o Presidente da Repúbli-
ca de suas funções, proposta a moção de impeachment 
pela maioria do total de seus membros, ela ainda deve 
ser aprovada por pelo menos dois terços daquele total 
para a suspensão do Presidente de suas funções, não 
menos verdade é o fato de que cabe à Corte Constitu-
cional, nos termos do artigo 111 da mesma Constitui-
ção31, adjudicar a constitucionalidade das leis, e também 
arbitrar a Constitucionalidade sobre os temas centrais 
da democracia Sul-Coreana, considerados o núcleo 
duro da Constituição.
A Coreia do Sul passou por um processo de rede-
mocratização após longo período de ditadura nos anos 
1970 e 1980, sendo neste particular similar ao Brasil, 
e sua Corte Constitucional é de inspiração alemã, com 
a presença de 9 juízes, dos quais 3 são indicados pelo 
Presidente, 3 pelo Congresso e outros 3 pelo Presidente 
da própria Corte Constitucional, para um período de 6 
anos, encarregada de apreciar 5 áreas específicas.32
Journal of  Democracy, vol. 19, n. 3, 2008, p. 138. 
30  Constituição Sul-Coreana: art. 65. [Impeachment] (1) No 
caso de o Presidente, o Primeiro Ministro, membros do Conselho 
de Estado, Chefes dos Ministérios, juízes da Corte Constitucional, 
Juízes, membros do comitê central eleitoral, membros do consel-
ho de Inspeções e Auditoria das contas, e outros oficiais públicos 
designados pela lei violarem a Constituição ou outras leis no de-
sempenho de suas funções, a Assembleia Nacional pode aprovar 
moções para seu Impeachment. (2) A moção para o impeachment 
no parágrafo primeiro, pode ser proposta por um terço ou mais do 
total dos membros da Assembleia Geral, e requer que pelo menos a 
maioria concorra para a sua aprovação: Sendo contra o presidente, 
ela deve ser proposta por metade dos membros da Assembleia Na-
cional e aprovada por dois terços ou mais do total de membros da 
Assembleia Nacional. (3) Qualquer pessoa contra quem a moção 
tenha sido aprovada fica suspensa de suas funções até que o im-
peachment tenha sido adjudicado. (4) Uma decisão no impeachment 
não se estende para além de afastar a função pública. Entretanto, ela 
não exime a pessoa impedida das responsabilidades civil e criminal. 
(Tradução Livre).
31  Constituição Sul-Coreana: art. 111. [Competência e indicações] 
(1) A Corte Constitucional é competente para adjudicar as seguintes 
matérias: 1) A Inconstitucionalidade das leis, a pedido dos Tribunais; 
2) o Impeachment; 3) A Dissolução dos Partidos Políticos; 4) As 
disputas entre as jurisdições entre Agências Estatais, entre estas e 
os governos locais, e entre os governos locais; 5) Petições relativas a 
Constituição, na forma da Lei; (Tradução Livre). 
32  A Corte foi estabelecida em 1987, e possui jurisdição sobre 
cinco áreas específicas: 1) Controle de Constitucionalidade das Leis; 
2) Impedimentos; 3) Dissolução dos Partidos Políticos; 4) Disputa 
Possui um governo presidencialista aliado a uma re-
pública parlamentarista, com um presidente, um primeiro 
ministro e um gabinete de estado, além de um legislativo 
unicameral, e um judiciário e uma Corte Constitucional. 
Especificamente sobre a decisão da Corte Constitucional 
da Coréia do Sul, relativa ao impeachment do então pre-
sidente Roh Moo-hyun, observamos que embora haja a 
fórmula geral (violação da Constituição), com a determi-
nação de que a última palavra cabe à Corte Constitucional, 
a Carta Constitucional Sul-Coreana não menciona quais 
atos concretos ensejariam o impedimento, diferente da 
Constituição Brasileira de 1988, que estabelece concretos 
atos atentatórios à Constituição como passíveis de impe-
dimento (art. 85 e art. 86 da CF/88).
 Recorde-se que a Assembleia Nacional agrupou as 
acusações contra o presidente Roh Moo-hyun em três 
tópicos distintos: 1) causar distúrbios ao Estado de Di-
reito (Disturbance of  the Rule of  Law), 2) Corrupção e 
Abuso de Poder, bem como 3) administração temerária. 
No que se refere ao primeiro tópico, a Assembleia Na-
cional alegou que o presidente apoiou indevidamente o 
Partido Uri nas eleições gerais, violando as leis eleito-
rais, que determinavam que os agentes políticos se man-
tivessem neutros, de modo a não influir no resultado 
das eleições.33
Em segundo lugar, alegou-se ainda que ele havia 
desrespeitado a Constituição, as comissões eleitorais e 
os órgãos estabelecidos ao questionar publicamente as 
suas afirmações sobre as acusações de influência eleito-
ral, ao propor uma consulta popular para confirmar a 
confiança do eleitorado em sua administração. No que 
se refere ao segundo tópico (corrupção e abuso de po-
der), alegaram que o presidente e seus aliados teriam 
aceito suborno e dinheiro de financiamento ilegal de 
campanhas eleitorais. O terceiro tópico (administração 
temerária) acusava o presidente de negligenciar suas 
funções, com falta de senso de direção, que geraria pro-
blemas e incertezas nos desenvolvimentos político e 
econômico.34
judicial entre corpos governamentais, e, 5) Petição de Direitos. Cfr. 
LEE, Youngjae. Law, Politics, and Impeachment: The Impeachment 
of  Roh Moo-hyun from a Comparative Constitutional Perspective. 
The American Journal of  Comparative Law, Vol. 53, 2005, p. 
413; MADDEX, Robert L. Constitutions of  the World. 3ª Ed. 
Washington, D. C.: CQPress, 2008, p. 400-403.
33  LEE, Youngjae. Law, Politics, and Impeachment: The Impeach-
ment of  Roh Moo-hyun from a Comparative Constitutional Perspective. 
The American Journal of  Comparative Law, Vol. 53, 2005, p. 414. 
34  LEE, Youngjae. Law, Politics, and Impeachment: The Im-
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Após um julgamento que durou trinta dias, envol-
vendo sete sessões, de 30 de março à 30 de abril de 
2004, a Corte Constitucional discordou da Assembleia 
Nacional, rejeitando sua moção de impeachment, re-
conduzindo o presidente de volta às suas funções. A 
decisão da Corte Constitucional possui duas partes.35 
Analisou inicialmente a questão sobre a alegada 
conduta temerária do presidente, tal como descrita pela 
Assembleia Nacional na moção de impedimento, no 
sentido de que ele “teria violado a Constituição ou ou-
tros atos”. Sequencialmente a Corte considerou a pro-
porcionalidade das violações, de modo a aferir se eram 
capazes de resultar em sua remoção do cargo.36
O princípio da proporcionalidade37 foi o principal 
argumento para a não remoção do presidente de seu 
cargo, vale dizer, a Corte Constitucional Sul-Coreana es-
tabeleceu que o guia para realizar a análise do caso seria 
a proporcionalidade para se averiguar se a violação das 
condutas dos agentes políticos seria grave o suficiente 
para justificar a suspensão de suas funções, e no con-
texto do impeachment, as variáveis relevantes seriam 
peachment of  Roh Moo-hyun from a Comparative Constitutional 
Perspective. The American Journal of  Comparative Law, Vol. 
53, 2005, p. 414. 
35  LEE, Youngjae. Law, Politics, and Impeachment: The Im-
peachment of  Roh Moo-hyun from a Comparative Constitutional 
Perspective. The American Journal of  Comparative Law, Vol. 
53, 2005, p. 415. 
36  LEE, Youngjae. Law, Politics, and Impeachment: The Im-
peachment of  Roh Moo-hyun from a Comparative Constitutional 
Perspective. The American Journal of  Comparative Law, Vol. 
53, 2005, p. 415. 
37  Um dos argumentos observados, segundo o acórdão, foi o que 
se segue: “Uma possível interpretação literal é que o artigo 53 (1) da 
Lei do Tribunal Constitucional prevê que o Tribunal Constitucional 
deve emitir automaticamente uma decisão de remover o funcionário 
público do cargo, desde que haja qualquer motivo válido para o im-
peachment estabelecido no artigo 65 (1) da Constituição. No entan-
to, sob tal interpretação, o Tribunal Constitucional é obrigado a or-
denar a destituição do cargo público sobre qualquer ato do requerido 
que viole o Direito sem levar em conta a gravidade da ilegalidade. 
Caso o requerido seja removido de seu cargo por todas e quais-
quer violações do Direito cometidos no exercício das suas funções 
oficiais, isso seria contrário ao princípio da proporcionalidade, que 
pede punição constitucional que corresponda à proporcionalidade 
da responsabilidade atribuída ao requerido. Portanto, a existência do 
‘motivo válido para o pedido de impeachment’, do artigo 53 (1) da 
Lei do Tribunal Constitucional significa a existência de uma violação 
suficientemente “grave” do direito para justificar a remoção de um 
funcionário público de suas funções, e não apenas qualquer violação 
da lei”. (Tradução Livre). Cfr.  CORÉIA DO SUL. Corte Constitu-
cional da Coréia do Sul. 2004Hun-Na1(Mar 14, 2004), View: 7, 
disponível em: <http://english.ccourt.go.kr/cckhome/eng/deci-
sions/majordecisions/majorList.do>, acesso em 11.11.2015.
a consideração acerca da mensuração do quanto essa 
medida seria proporcional, tendo a Corte observado 
oposição comparativa entre “a gravidade da violação” 
e as “consequências do afastamento de suas funções”.38
A Corte entendeu que o presidente havia violado o 
direito em três situações. Primeiro, entendeu que havia 
violação do dever de neutralidade nas eleições, no caso 
do apoio ao Partido Uri. Segundo, entendeu que ele 
também violara seus deveres Constitucionais ao desa-
fiar a validade das leis eleitorais e questionado o Comi-
tê Eleitoral. Em terceiro, o presidente também violou 
seus deveres ao propor uma consulta popular sem que 
houvesse base constitucional para tanto. Não obstante, 
a Corte entendeu que nenhuma dessas violações eram 
suficientemente gravosas a ponto de justificar sua remo-
ção do cargo.39
Foram considerados dois argumentos principais 
como consequências adversas do afastamento do presi-
dente de suas funções, quais sejam, equivaleria, em pri-
meiro lugar, em reduzir o mandato de um líder demo-
craticamente eleito, violando a vontade do eleitorado, e, 
portanto, a soberania popular. Segundo, considerou-se 
como consequência adversa a agitação política que ad-
viria do fato de interromper uma administração até que 
um novo presidente fosse eleito, influindo no trabalho 
da administração.  Neste sentido, a Corte considerou 
que a conduta do presidente, embora violadora do direi-
to, e que como tal, deveria ser considerada, concluiu, no 
entanto, em favor da legitimidade democrática de seu 
mandato e pela importância da continuidade da admi-
nistração.40
A questão remanescente foi referir-se a que tipo de 
violação seria considerada séria o bastante para justificar 
as consequências adversas do afastamento do presiden-
te de suas funções. Com efeito, em razão de o processo 
de impeachment ser a de proteger e preservar a Consti-
tuição, a Corte Constitucional explicou que a gravidade 
38  LEE, Youngjae. Law, Politics, and Impeachment: The Im-
peachment of  Roh Moo-hyun from a Comparative Constitutional 
Perspective. The American Journal of  Comparative Law, Vol. 
53, 2005, p. 418. 
39  LEE, Youngjae. Law, Politics, and Impeachment: The Im-
peachment of  Roh Moo-hyun from a Comparative Constitutional 
Perspective. The American Journal of  Comparative Law, Vol. 
53, 2005, p. 415. 
40  LEE, Youngjae. Law, Politics, and Impeachment: The Im-
peachment of  Roh Moo-hyun from a Comparative Constitutional 
Perspective. The American Journal of  Comparative Law, Vol. 
53, 2005, p. 419. 
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da violação deve ser considerada da perspectiva de se 
proteger a ordem constitucional, significando isso que 
a questão efetivamente relevante, in caso, seria perquirir 
“quanto dano relativo a ordem constitucional existen-
te teria sido infligida pela alegada violação legal”. Com 
efeito, a Corte concluiu que o impeachment e o afasta-
mento seriam adequados apenas quando tais atos fo-
rem “necessários para reabilitar a ordem constitucional 
malferida”.41
Mais precisamente, a Corte Constitucional Sul-Co-
reana equacionou a “ordem constitucional” como sen-
do composta por “uma ordem básica livre e democrá-
tica”, que consistiria no respeito aos direitos humanos 
fundamentais, na separação dos poderes, na indepen-
dência judicial, nas instituições parlamentares, no sis-
tema multipartidário e nas instituições eleitorais, tendo 
a Corte listado dezenas de exemplos de atos que dire-
tamente ameaçavam “uma ordem básica livre e demo-
crática” (como p. ex. a captação de propina, corrupção, 
fraude, abuso dos poderes presidenciais para atacar a 
autoridade de outros poderes, a violação dos direitos 
humanos e a opressão dos cidadãos por meio do uso 
do poder coercitivo das instituições estatais, o uso do 
cargo para apoio a campanhas ilegais e manipulação dos 
resultados eleitorais).42
A partir deste ponto de vista, a Corte sustentou que 
nenhuma das violações cometidas pelo presidente justi-
ficavam proporcionalmente sua remoção do cargo, pois 
o apoio ao Partido Uri não teria equivalido “a um esque-
ma premeditado, ativamente” para o uso da autoridade 
governamental para minar o processo democrático. An-
tes, e ao invés disso, teria sido apenas um pronuncia-
mento de apoio que foi incidental a suas respostas a re-
pórteres que indagaram sobre suas predileções políticas 
durante as eleições.43
Do mesmo modo, o desafio a autoridade da comis-
são eleitoral sobre as acusações que lhe teriam sido fei-
41  LEE, Youngjae. Law, Politics, and Impeachment: The Im-
peachment of  Roh Moo-hyun from a Comparative Constitutional 
Perspective. The American Journal of  Comparative Law, Vol. 
53, 2005, p. 419. 
42  LEE, Youngjae. Law, Politics, and Impeachment: The Im-
peachment of  Roh Moo-hyun from a Comparative Constitutional 
Perspective. The American Journal of  Comparative Law, Vol. 
53, 2005, p. 419. 
43  LEE, Youngjae. Law, Politics, and Impeachment: The Im-
peachment of  Roh Moo-hyun from a Comparative Constitutional 
Perspective. The American Journal of  Comparative Law, Vol. 
53, 2005, p. 419. 
tas não teriam sido sérias o bastante para justificar sua 
remoção do cargo, pois não equivaleu a uma tentativa 
de destruição da ordem democrática, e nem arranhava a 
ideia de estado de direito. E por fim, a Corte entendeu 
que estaria dentro do escopo dos poderes presidenciais 
a sugestão de aferição de seu apoio, sem que com isso 
se buscasse extinguir a oposição, vale dizer, sua condu-
ta não teria sido suficientemente grave para justificar a 
proporcionalidade da medida.44
Quanto as outras acusações (administração temerá-
ria e corrupção), pois nem todas elas foram considera-
das, a Corte Constitucional compreendeu que elas não 
se enquadravam na tipicidade constitucional de violação 
da Constituição, no primeiro caso, e no segundo, que 
se relacionavam a condutas estranhas ao exercício do 
cargo, pois supostamente cometidas antes dele assumir 
a presidência do país, razão pela qual foram sumaria-
mente desconsideradas no julgamento da adequação do 
impeachment.45
Trata-se de uma decisão que seria vista em outros 
países de maneira estranha, sobretudo nos Estados 
Unidos da América, em que o Federalist Paper n. 65 de 
Alexader Hamilton obtemperava que a Suprema Corte 
deveria ficar do lado de fora da tomada de decisão sobre 
o Impedimento do Presidente da República, em razão 
de uma decisão como essa ficar a cargo de um reduzido 
número de pessoas.
O caso do Impedimento do Presidente Sul-Coreano 
possui uma explicação importante, qual seja, a de que a 
Constituição daquele país, paradoxalmente influenciada 
pelos Estados Unidos, explicitamente atribui a Corte 
Constitucional a jurisdição para que ela decida sobre o 
processo de impedimento, sendo sua Carta Constitu-
cional diferente da Constituição Americana.46 O mes-
mo raciocínio se aplica, ao que nos parece, ao Brasil, 
pois a simples presença da cláusula da inafastabilidade 
do controle jurisdicional (art. 5º, XXXV), ausente na 
44  LEE, Youngjae. Law, Politics, and Impeachment: The Im-
peachment of  Roh Moo-hyun from a Comparative Constitutional 
Perspective. The American Journal of  Comparative Law, Vol. 
53, 2005, p. 419. 
45  LEE, Youngjae. Law, Politics, and Impeachment: The Im-
peachment of  Roh Moo-hyun from a Comparative Constitutional 
Perspective. The American Journal of  Comparative Law, Vol. 
53, 2005, p. 419. 
46  LEE, Youngjae. Law, Politics, and Impeachment: The Im-
peachment of  Roh Moo-hyun from a Comparative Constitutional 
Perspective. The American Journal of  Comparative Law, Vol. 
53, 2005, p. 406. 
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Constituição Americana, permite falar também em uma 
diferença constitucionalmente estrutural.
Há ainda a presença do mesmo argumento utiliza-
do para legitimar a atuação da Corte Sul-Coreana, no 
sentido de que ela estava simplesmente arbitrando uma 
disputa entre um Congresso eleito democraticamen-
te e um Presidente da República igualmente eleito de 
maneira democrática, muito embora se faça presente o 
argumento problematizador utilizado pelos acadêmicos 
dos Estados Unidos para apontar a inadequação da sin-
dicabilidade judicial: o déficit democrático dos Juízes da 
Corte47, embora a maneira de indicação dos membros 
da Corte Constitucional sejam extremamente mais plu-
rais que os da Suprema Corte Americana. 
Mas o modelo não é de todo estranho ao mundo 
Constitucional, bastando recordar que na Alemanha, 
quando se pretender o impedimento do Presidente, o 
Bundestag ou o Bundesrat deverão levar sua moção de im-
pedimento até a Corte Constitucional Alemã48, sendo 
similar ao que ocorre na Hungria, em que a palavra fi-
nal para a remoção do Presidente recai perante a Corte 
Constitucional, igualmente ao que também ocorre na 
República Checa e na Croácia.49 Mencione-se ainda a 
competência da Corte Constitucional italiana para apre-
47  LEE, Youngjae. Law, Politics, and Impeachment: The Im-
peachment of  Roh Moo-hyun from a Comparative Constitutional 
Perspective. The American Journal of  Comparative Law, Vol. 
53, 2005, p. 406. 
48  Conforme o artigo 61 da Lei Fundamental (Grundgesetz). 
Cfr. “[Acusação perante o Tribunal Constitucional Federal]. (1) O 
Parlamento Federal ou o Conselho Federal podem acusar o Presi-
dente Federal perante o Tribunal Constitucional Federal por vio-
lação intencional da Lei Fundamental ou de uma outra lei federal. 
O requerimento de acusação deverá ser proposto, no mínimo, pela 
quarta parte dos membros do Parlamento Federal ou por um quarto 
dos votos do Conselho Federal. A aprovação do requerimento de 
acusação necessita da maioria de dois terços dos membros do Par-
lamento Federal ou de dois terços dos votos do Conselho Federal. 
A acusação será formalizada por um delegado do órgão que apre-
sentou a acusação. (2) Se o Tribunal Constitucional Federal consta-
tar que o Presidente Federal violou intencionalmente a Lei Funda-
mental ou outra lei federal, ele poderá declarar a sua destituição do 
cargo. Por meio de uma disposição provisória, poderá determinar o 
impedimento do Presidente Federal para o exercício do seu cargo, 
depois de formalizada a acusação”. 
49  Modelos similares são apontados, ainda, na Costa Rica, na 
Croácia, Albânia, Bolívia, Bulgária, Marrocos, Eslovênia, Taiwan, 
Ucrânia. Cfr. KADA, Naoko. Comparative Constitutional Impeach-
ment: Conclusions, In Checking Executive Power. Apud: LEE, 
Youngjae. Law, Politics, and Impeachment: The Impeachment of  
Roh Moo-hyun from a Comparative Constitutional Perspective. 
The American Journal of  Comparative Law, Vol. 53, 2005, p. 
406; MADDEX, Robert L. Constitutions of  the World. 3ª Ed. 
Washington, D. C.: CQPress, 2008, p. 113; 200 e ss.
ciar as acusações de atentado à Constituição ou de alta 
traição contra o Presidente, expresso no artigo 135 da 
Constituição da República Italiana.50
Conforme observa Tom Ginsburg, a prática con-
temporânea nos mostra que geralmente os sistemas 
constitucionais nascem de atos corajosos impregnados 
de designes institucionais intencionais, encorpados em 
um documento político, e tais desenhos envolvem fron-
teiras, aprendizagem e acomodação, mas também invo-
ca momentos de inovação criativa e experimentalismo 
institucional.51 Não é possível discordar da alegação de 
maneira fácil, parecendo que, ao menos em princípio, se 
encontra adequada a observação.
Em termos similares, invocando John Hart Ely, John 
Elster recorda que a questão mais importante sobre os 
Tribunais se refere a limpeza dos canais da mudança po-
lítica, que está ligada igualmente a limpeza dos canais da 
criação constitucional, animada esta última, na origem, 
por três fatores primordiais: interesse, razão e paixão, 
vale dizer, um ótimo processo constituinte deve ser 
guiado pela razão, em respeito ao bem comum a longo 
prazo, bem como deve eliminar, tanto quanto possível, 
a influência da paixão e dos interesses pessoais.52
Isso significa que qualquer decisão posterior, dentro 
de determinado sistema Constitucional, deve buscar o 
prosseguimento de tais premissas, ou seja, afastar a pai-
xão política e os interesses pessoais, com a manutenção 
da razão que a deveria guiar desde sempre. Some-se a 
esta equação uma clausula que, como na Constituição 
da Coréia do Sul (e também da Alemanha, na qual o 
sistema constitucional daquela nação é inspirado), es-
tabelece que o impedimento presidencial deve ficar a 
cargo de uma Corte Constitucional, ou uma cláusula 
como a que está prevista no art. 5º, XXXV da CF/88, a 
inafastabilidade do controle jurisdicional, que são filtros 
contra o auto interesse e a paixão reinantes no meio 
político.
50  Conjugação dos artigos 90 (estado de acusação pelo Parla-
mento) e 135 e 136 (julgamento pela Corte Constitucional) da Carta 
Constitucional italiana, neste caso chamada de único caso de “justiça 
política” da Corte Constitucional. Cfr. ONIDA, Valerio. La Con-
stituzione: La legge fondamentale dela Repubblica. 2ª Ed. Bo-
logna: Il Mulino, 2007, p. 111.
51  GINSBURG, Tom. Comparative Constitutional Design. 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012, p. 1. 
52  ELSTER, John. Clearing and Strengthening the Channels of  
Constitution Making. In: GINSBURG, Tom. Comparative Con-
stitutional Design. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012, 
p. 15 e ss. 
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Ou seja, o papel do Poder Judiciário, do Supremo 
Tribunal ou da Corte Constitucional é o de verificar se 
a Constituição Federal foi cumprida, exercendo a con-
tenção, na dificuldade contramajoritária, vale dizer, não 
importa o que digam as massas, não importando o peso 
da opinião pública, ou seja, a única estrela guia deve ser 
apenas e tão somente a Constituição Federal e os valo-
res, regras e princípios que a animam.
Tome-se como reflexão, ainda, o fato de que a Cons-
tituição da Coréia do Sul, originária de 1948 (e emenda-
da largamente em 1987) foi profundamente influenciada 
pelos Estados Unidos, cujo governo militar na Coréia 
do Sul era conhecido pela sigla USAMGIK, durante o 
período em que a Coréia do Sul era administrada pelos 
Estados Unidos, e a Coréia do Norte, pela então União 
Soviética.53
A grande questão em torno disso tudo reside na 
conformação daquilo que Roberto Gargarella estudou 
tão densamente, ao resumir a questão da “dificuldade 
contramajoritária”: como pode ser que em uma socie-
dade democrática, o ramo de poder com credenciais de-
mocráticas mais débeis, o poder judiciário, fique encar-
regado de dar “a última palavra” institucional, e possa, 
com efeito, dizer e decidir de maneira final e definitiva 
as controvérsias públicas mais importantes, sobretudo 
na América Latina?54
Exatamente porque deixar a última palavra a cargo de 
órgãos majoritários resulta aterrador, em contextos como 
os da América Latina, em que os poderes políticos muitas 
vezes parecem isentos de amarras e controle, e em alguns 
casos, pior do que isso, aparecem dominados por podero-
sas facções e grupos de interesse fanáticos pelo exercício 
do poder. No entanto, muito embora o questionamento 
seja válido também para observar e ressaltar uma tendên-
cia ao hiperpresidencialismo com poucos controles, um 
congresso com legitimidade minguada e alto desgaste da 
representação política, não se pode esquecer também que 
a tentativa de submeter o poder judicial ao controle de um 
dos ramos do governo (legislativo ou executivo) representa 
uma tentativa de se apoderar das chaves fundamentais de 
nossa estrutura institucional.55
53  MADDEX, Robert L. Constitutions of  the World. 3ª Ed. 
Washington, D. C.: CQPress, 2008, p. 400. 
54  GARGARELLA, Roberto. La Justicia frente al Gobierno: 
sobre el caráter contramayoritario del poder judicial. Quito: 
Centro de Estudios y Difusión del Derecho Constitucional, 2011, 
p. 17.
55  GARGARELLA, Roberto. La Justicia frente al Gobierno: 
Sobre a experiência constitucional da Coréia do Sul, 
relativa ao interessante caso da tentativa de impeach-
ment do presidente em 2004, temos que observar que 
é uma importante experiência Constitucional a ser ob-
servada pelo Supremo Tribunal Federal, sobretudo por-
que no Brasil vigora a cláusula de inafastabilidade do 
controle jurisdicional, aliado a presença do princípio da 
proporcionalidade, largamente utilizado pela Suprema 
Corte. 
Neste sentido, se a guarda da Constituição é atri-
buída ao Supremo Tribunal, e se este deve verificar o 
cumprimento da Carta Constitucional, inclusive com a 
aplicação do teste da proporcionalidade, é de rigor re-
conhecer que cabe a este tribunal, assim como coube a 
Corte Constitucional da Coréia do Sul, julgar sobre a 
adequação e a proporcionalidade do impedimento pre-
sidencial, diferente de quando a Suprema Corte busca 
traçar os rumos do modelo político, reformando ins-
tituições e sistemas eleitorais. Em todo caso, a Corte 
deve cuidar de sua legitimidade institucional, exercendo 
suas funções nos estritos limites constitucionais, e com 
muita parcimônia.
Ressalve-se o fato de que o Supremo Tribunal Fede-
ral não é uma Corte Constitucional, conforme afirmado 
por Paulo Brossard no MS 20.941/DF, discordando de 
afirmação feita pelo ministro Moreira Alves, no sentido 
de que o STF estaria acima dos demais poderes, muito 
embora existam algumas aproximações estritas e pon-
tuais, como o julgamento sobre a constitucionalidade 
da lei em tese, e a função de exercer a guarda da Consti-
tuição, dizendo de atos concretos se eles respeitaram o 
devido processo legal, a ampla defesa, o contraditório, e 
se foram proporcionais.
Giovani Sartori nos fornece uma advertência inquie-
tante, ao realizar profunda reflexão sobre o constitucio-
nalismo, dizendo que quando um problema político é 
despolitizado – “e o constitucionalismo seria, inescapa-
velmente, uma solução jurídica para um problema po-
lítico” - as consequências reais de tornar uma atitude 
jurídica neutra seriam políticas, ainda que inconsciente-
mente, vale dizer, quando estamos diante de um julga-
mento, se descobre justamente que aquilo que os juris-
tas “puros” realmente tem feito é, homiziar-se embaixo 
do escudo de sua indiferença judicial para questões me-
sobre el caráter contramayoritario del poder judicial. Quito: 
Centro de Estudios y Difusión del Derecho Constitucional, 2011, 
p. 17. 
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tajurídicas, pavimentando a via para permitir que polí-
ticos inescrupulosos realizem um uso discricionário do 
poder sob a camuflagem de uma boa palavra, razão pela 
qual a “Política não pode ser retirada da política, nem de 
forma discursiva”.56
Com isto se quer observar que, diferentemente do 
que pode parecer, a solução jurídica para um problema 
político (noção de constitucionalismo balizada acima, a 
partir de Giovani Sartori) admite a autonomia do direi-
to, conforme obtemperado por Owen Fiss, pois a fina-
lidade do direito é a justiça (e aqui nós observamos: jus-
tiça da legalidade constitucional), e não necessariamente 
compatível com a democracia57, e, embora devamos to-
mar a sério também a advertência de Cass Sunstein, de 
que uma democracia constitucional não deveria se preo-
cupar com a “alma de seus cidadãos”58, fato é que deve 
ser preocupar, e muito, com a relação imagética relativa 
a dualidade “assassinato”/“impeachment” em termos 
de iconoclash e das consequências possíveis, sobretudo 
se há percepção de sinais de rupturas institucionais, tais 
como aqueles refletidos por Gerardo Pisarello.59
56  SARTORI, Giovani. Constitutionalism: A Preliminary Discus-
sion. The American Political Science Review, vol. 56, n. 4, 1962, 
p. 864. 
57  FISS, Owen. The Autonomy of  Law. Yale Journal of  Inter-
national Law, vol. 26, 2001.
58  SUNSTEIN, Cass. Preferencias y Política. Revista Argentina 
de Teoria Jurídica, vol. 9, nov., 2008.
59  Este autor faz a mais lúcida e concatenada abordagem já escrita 
sobre o poder constituinte. Não basta fazer uma descrição metafóri-
ca com mera junção de espelhos quebrados da história, como em-
barcar em Donoso Cortez, maior influenciador de Carl Schmitt, 
ao dizer que o poder Constituinte é como o raio que atravessa a 
nuvem, fere a vítima e desaparece, não podendo ser localizada nos 
livros e nem formulada por filósofos. Não é uma imagem real, e 
nem tampouco fidedigna. Pode ser formulada pelo filósofo, e o raio 
não será necessariamente um fato político importante. Como afirma 
Pisarello, há a importância de se observar o “poder destituinte-insti-
tuinte”, cujo gatilho catalizador pode ser uma canção de protesto, 
como aquelas cantadas em frente ao Parlamento Islandês em 2008, 
ou a imolação de um cidadão nas ruas da cidade, como no caso 
de Mohamed Bouazizi na Tunísia em 2010. A ideia de um Poder 
Constituinte Democrático ocorre como um recurso extremo com-
posto de uma série de circunstâncias concretas, como a existência de 
uma agressão econômica, política e cultural provocada por uma es-
trutura de poder determinada, passando por uma perda crescente de 
legitimidade daqueles líderes da referida estrutura, culminando com 
“percepção entre os grupos subalternos de que a referida situação se 
tornou injusta e insuportável, aliado a percepção de que é possível 
empreender exitosamente algum tipo de ação coletiva para acabar 
com ela”. Cfr. PISARELLO, Gerardo. Procesos constituyentes: 
caminhos para la ruptura democrática. Madrid: Trotta, 2014, p. 
171 e ss.
3. consIdeRAções FInAIs
A par desta breve incursão de contraste60 compara-
tivo61, observamos que não é de todo estranho o envol-
vimento de uma Corte Judicial no processo de impedi-
mento de Presidentes da República. Deve-se destacar 
que a Constituição Americana, que não criou o mode-
lo de impedimento, mas o estabeleceu concretamente 
no sistema presidencialista, é diferente da maioria das 
Constituições, como a Constituição Alemã, a Constitui-
ção Sul-Coreana e a Constituição Brasileira.
Embora a pretensão deste artigo acadêmico não seja 
referir explicitamente sobre o caso brasileiro, pode-se 
concluir que a atuação do Supremo Tribunal Federal 
nos casos de impedimento se destinam a checar a apli-
cação da Constituição, vale dizer, se foi respeitado o de-
vido processo legal, a ampla defesa e o contraditório, e 
a proporcionalidade bem como se a tipicidade do crime 
de responsabilidade se faz presente. Não há aqui nenhu-
ma intrusão democrática. 
Aliás, o papel da Suprema Corte é contramajoritá-
rio, e, portanto, pode inclusive ir contra dois tipos de 
maioria no processo de impedimento: uma – da Câma-
ra, relativamente coesa e representativa; e a outra, - do 
Senado, com possibilidade de distorções tão dramáticas 
que Paulo Brossard chamou atenção em difundido tex-
to após o julgamento de Fernando Collor, de modo a 
deixar patente a necessidade de se repensar o modelo.62 
60  Conforme observa Marc Ancel, o direito comparado revela a 
relatividade do direito nacional existente. Cfr. ANCEL, Marc. Uti-
lidade e Métodos do Direito Comparado. Porto Alegre:  Sérgio 
Antonio Fabris, 1980, p.141.
61  Neste particular, ressalte-se as reflexões de Arnaldo Godoy, 
para quem o “direito constitucional comparado problematiza a tese 
de que a sociedade se vê refletida no direito”, vale dizer, “as consti-
tuições escritas que vicejam pelo mundo reproduzem ideário único, 
de matriz racional, iluminista e oitocentista, e que podem divergir 
dos padrões culturais que as envolvem, em alguns casos”. GODOY, 
Arnaldo Sampaio de Moraes. Direito Constitucional Comparado. 
Porto Alegre: Sérgio Antonio Fabris, 2006, p. 13.
62  Sobre as distorções possíveis, sobretudo no Senado, confira-
se as observações de Paulo Brossard: “O absurdo salta aos olhos. 
Em uma Câmara de 503 deputados, 441 votaram pela instauração do 
processo, mais de quatro quintos, por conseguinte. Embora esse voto 
não tenha caráter condenatório, não deixa de possuir formidável car-
ga nesse sentido. Não se autoriza a instauração de um processo, que 
leva ao afastamento do chefe do Estado, senão em face de situação de 
fato extremamente grave. Pois bem, instaurado o processo, a conde-
nação só se daria se 54 senadores, em 81, votassem por ela, o que im-
porta em dizer que o voto de 28 senadores pode prevalecer e tornar 
inconsequente o voto de 441 deputados e de 53 Senadores. Mas pode 
ocorrer ainda que os 28 senadores dissidentes sejam representantes 
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De toda sorte, observa-se nesta parte final e conclu-
siva que existem boas razões para que a Corte Suprema 
atue com parcimônia, mas é inegável que ela possui a 
atribuições Constitucionais de verificar a presença da 
legalidade constitucional no caso concreto, que de cer-
ta forma corresponde a atribuir a ela a última palavra 
para verificar – ou checar – se a primeira palavra do 
Constituinte está sendo cumprida, nesta ambiência de 
expectativas Constitucionais, pois processo é poder63, e 
também a estrutura óssea da sociedade democrática64, 
e não se admite que qualquer poder seja utilizado de 
modo a desbordar das limitações da Constituição.
Válida, portanto, a reflexão do tema à luz da expe-
riência Sul-Coreana, no dramático julgamento da Corte 
Constitucional deste país acerca do impedimento do 
presidente. Se o impedimento é uma espécie de “assas-
sinato”, que pode convulsionar o país e colocar em risco 
o próprio processo democrático, mister refletir de ma-
neira detida sobre a engenhosa solução construída pela 
Corte Constitucional da Coréia do Sul, cuja identidade 
de ação pode ser vislumbrada em várias outras Cortes 
Constitucionais pelo mundo, como Alemanha, Itália, 
Croácia, Hungria, Ucrânia, Costa Rica, entre outros. 
Por tais motivos, soluções constitucionalmente ade-
quadas são aquelas que permitem a uma Suprema Corte 
o cumprimento de seu papel institucional, de modo a 
verificar se a decisão política foi uma decisão jurídica, 
nos estritos marcos do Constitucionalismo.
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Anexo: decIsão dA coRte constItucIonAl dA 
coRéIA do sul
Caso do Impeachment do Presidente Roh Moo-
hyun - 2004Hun-Na1(Mar 14, 2004)
[16-1 KCCR 609, 2004Hun-Na1, May 14, 2004]
Contents of the Decision
1. The subject matter to be adjudicated by the Cons-
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titutional Court in the impeachment adjudication pro-
ceeding.
2. Whether or not the due process principle is di-
rectly applicable in the impeachment proceeding at the 
National Assembly. (negative)
3. The nature of  the impeachment proceeding set 
forth in Article 65 of  the Constitution.
4. The meaning of  the grounds for impeachment set 
forth in Article 65 of  the Constitution.
5. The constitutional ground for the obligation of  
political neutrality by public officials concerning elec-
tions.
6. Whether or not the President is a “public official” 
within the meaning of  Article 9 of  the Act on the Elec-
tion of  Public Officials and the Prevention of  Election 
Malpractices (hereinafter the “Public Officials Election 
Act”). (affirmative)
7. Whether or not the statements of  the President 
expressing support for a particular political party at 
press conferences violate the obligation of  political 
neutrality by public officials. (affirmative)
8. Whether or not the statements of  the President 
expressing support for a particular political party at 
press conferences are in violation of  the provision that 
prohibits electoral campaigns by public officials set for-
th in Article 60 of  the Public Officials Election Act. 
(negative)
9. The obligation of  the President to abide by and 
preserve the Constitution.
10. Whether or not the act taken by the President to-
ward the National Election Commission’s decision fin-
ding the President’s breach of  the election law violates 
the constitution. (affirmative)
11.Whether or not the President’s act proposing a 
national referendum on whether he should remain in 
office violates the Constitution. (affirmative)
12.Whether or not the incidents of  corruption invol-
ving the President’s close acquaintances and associates 
constitute a violation of  law by the President. (negative)
13.Whether or not the political chaos and economic 
disruption caused by the unfaithful performance of  the 
official duties and reckless management of  the state 
affairs can be a subject matter for an impeachment ad-
judication at the Constitutional Court. (negative)
14.Whether or not the “valid ground for the petition 
for impeachment adjudication” set forth in Section 1, 
Article 53 of  the Constitutional Court Act is limited to 
a grave violation of  law. (affirmative)
15.The standard of  review to be applied in determi-
ning the “gravity of  the violation of  law”.
16.Whether or not the President should be remo-
ved from office where, as in the instant case, there is 
no finding of  the President’s active intent against the 
constitutional order in his specific acts of  violations of  
law. (negative)
17.Whether or not the separate opinions may be 
disclosed at the impeachment adjudication proceeding. 
(negative)
Summary of the Decision
1. The Constitutional Court, as a judicial institution, 
is restrained in principle to the grounds for impeach-
ment stated in the National Assembly’s impeachment 
resolution. Therefore, no other grounds for impeach-
ment than those stated in the impeachment resolution 
may constitute the subject matter to be adjudicated by 
the Constitutional Court at the impeachment adjudica-
tion proceeding. However, with respect to the ‘deter-
mination on legal provisions,’ the violation of  which is 
alleged in the impeachment resolution, the Constitutio-
nal Court in principle is not bound thereby. Therefore, 
the Constitutional Court may determine the facts that 
led to the impeachment based on other relevant legal 
provisions as well as the legal provisions which the peti-
tioner alleges have been violated. Also, the Constitutio-
nal Court is not bound by the structure of  the grounds 
for impeachment as categorized by the National As-
sembly in its impeachment resolution in determining 
the grounds for impeachment. Therefore, the question 
of  in which relations the grounds for impeachment are 
legally examined is absolutely for the Constitutional 
Court to determine.
2. The principle of  due process is a legal principle 
that, before a decision is made by the governmental 
power, entitles a citizen who might be prejudiced by 
such a decision to an opportunity to express his or her 
opinion and thereby influence the process of  the pro-
ceedings and the result thereof. In this case, the impea-
chment proceeding at the National Assembly concerns 
two constitutional institutions of  the National Assem-
bly and the President, and the National Assembly’s 
P
Á
D
U
A
, T
h
ia
go
 A
gu
ia
r;
 G
U
E
D
E
S,
 J
ef
fe
rs
o
n
 C
ar
ús
. A
lg
um
as
 R
efl
ex
õ
es
 s
o
b
re
 a
s 
L
in
h
as
 d
e 
F
o
rç
a 
e 
as
 L
im
it
aç
õ
es
 C
o
n
st
it
uc
io
n
ai
s 
do
 I
m
p
ed
im
en
to
 P
re
si
de
n
ci
al
: o
 c
as
o
 S
ul
-C
o
re
an
o
 d
e 
20
04
. U
n
iv
er
si
ta
s 
Ju
s,
 B
ra
sí
lia
, v
. 2
7,
 n
. 3
, 2
01
6 
p.
 1
7-
62
31
resolution to impeach the President merely suspends 
the exercise of  the power and authorities of  the Pre-
sident as a state institution and does not impede upon 
the fundamental rights of  the President as a private in-
dividual. Therefore, the due process principle that has 
been formed as a legal principle applicable to the exer-
cise of  governmental power by a state institution in its 
relationship with its citizens shall not be directly appli-
cable in the impeachment proceeding that is designed 
to protect the Constitution against a state institution. 
Furthermore, there is no express provision of  law con-
cerning the impeachment proceeding that requires an 
opportunity to be heard for the respondent. Therefore, 
the argument that the impeachment proceeding at the 
National Assembly was in violation of  the due process 
principle is without merit.
3. Article 65 of  the Constitution provides for the 
possibility of  impeachment of  high-ranking public 
officials of  the executive branch and of  the judiciary 
for violation of  the Constitution or statutes. It there-
by functions as a warning to such public officials not 
to violate the Constitution and thus also prevents such 
violations. Further, where certain state institutions are 
delegated with state authority by the citizenry but abuse 
such authority to violate the Constitution or statutes, 
the impeachment process functions to deprive such sta-
te institutions of  their authority. That is, reinforcing the 
normative power of  the Constitution by holding certain 
public officials legally responsible for their violation of  
the Constitution in exercising their official duties is the 
purpose and the function of  the impeachment process.
4. An analysis of  the specific grounds for impea-
chment set forth in Article 65 of  the Constitution re-
veals that the ‘official duties’ as provided in ‘exercising 
the official duties’ mean the duties that are inherent in 
particular governmental offices as provided by law and 
also other duties related thereto as commonly unders-
tood. Therefore, acts in exercising official duties mean 
any and all acts or activities necessary for or concomi-
tant with the nature of  a specific public office under the 
relevant statutes, orders, regulations, or administrative 
customs and practices. As the Constitution provides 
the grounds for impeachment as a “violation of  the 
Constitution or statutes,” the ‘Constitution’ includes the 
unwritten Constitution formed and established by the 
precedents of  the Constitutional Court as well as the 
express constitutional provisions; the ‘statutes’ include 
the statutes in their formal meaning, international trea-
ties that are provided with the same force as statutes, 
and the international law that is generally approved.
5.The obligation to maintain political neutrality at 
the election owed by public officials is a constitutional 
request drawn from the status of  public officials as ‘civil 
servants for the entire citizenry’ as set forth in Article 
7(1) of  the Constitution; the principle of  free election 
set forth in Articles 41(1) and Article 67(1) of  the Cons-
titution; and the equal opportunity among the political 
parties guaranteed by Article 116(1) of  the Constitu-
tion. Article 9 of  the Public Officials Election Act is 
a legal provision that specifies and realizes the above 
constitutional request.
6. ‘Public officials’ within the meaning of  Article 9 
of  the Public Officials Election Act mean any and all 
public officials who should be obligated to maintain 
neutrality concerning elections, that is, more specifi-
cally, any and all public officials who are in a position 
to threaten the ‘principle of  free election’ and ‘equal 
opportunity among the political parties at the election.’ 
Considering that practically all public officials are in a 
position to exercise undue influence upon the election 
in the course of  exercising official duties, the public 
officials here include, in principle, all public officials of  
the national and local governments, that is, all career 
public officials as narrowly defined, and, further include 
public officials at offices of  political nature who ser-
ve the state through active political activities. Here, the 
exception is that members of  the National Assembly 
and the members of  the local legislatures are excluded 
from ‘public officials’ within the meaning of  Article 9 
of  the Public Officials Election Act, as no political neu-
trality concerning elections can be requested from such 
members of  the legislatures due to their status as the 
representatives of  the political parties and the directly 
interested parties in the political campaign.
Therefore, political neutrality at the election is a ba-
sic obligation owed by all public officials of  the execu-
tive branch and of  the judiciary. Furthermore, since the 
President bears the obligation to over- see and mana-
ge a fair electoral process as the head of  the executive 
branch, the President is, as a matter of  course, a ‘public 
official’ within the meaning of  Article 9 of  the Public 
Officials Election Act.
7. If  the President makes a one-sided statement in 
support of  a particular political party and influences the 
process through which the public opinion is formed, 
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the President thereby interferes with and distorts the 
process of  the independent formation of  the public’s 
opinion based on a just evaluation of  the political par-
ties and the candidates. This, at the same time, dimi-
nishes by half  the meaning of  the political activities 
continuously performed by the political parties and the 
candidates in the past several years in order to obtain 
the trust of  the public, and thereby gravely depreciates 
the principle of  parliamentary democracy. The relevant 
part of  the President’s statements at issue in this regard 
repeatedly and actively expressed his support for a par-
ticular political party in the course of  performing the 
President’s official duties and further directly appealed 
to the public for the support of  that particular political 
party.
Therefore, the president’s statements toward the 
entire public at press conferences in support of  a par-
ticular political party made by taking advantage of  the 
political significance and influence of  the office of  the 
President, when political neutrality of  public officials 
is required more than ever before as general elections 
approach, were in violation of  the neutrality obligation 
concerning elections as acts unjustly influencing the 
elections and thereby affecting the outcome of  the elec-
tions by taking advantage of  the status of  the President.
8. Article 58(1) of  the Public Officials Election Act 
makes it a prerequisite for the electoral campaign ‘whe-
ther or not a candidate can be specified,’ by defining the 
concept of  ‘electoral campaign’ adopting the standard 
of  ‘being elected.’ When the statements at issue in this 
case were made on February 18, 2004 and February 24, 
2004, the party-endorsed candidates had not yet been 
determined. Therefore, the statements in support of  a 
particular political party when the party-endorsed can-
didates were not yet specified did not constitute an elec-
toral campaign.
Furthermore, considering that the president’s sta-
tements at issue herein were neither actively made nor 
premeditated as such statements were made in the 
form of  the President’s response to questions posed 
by the reporters at press conferences, neither was there 
an active or premeditated element to be found in the 
President’s statements, nor, as a result, a purposeful in-
tention sufficient to find the nature of  a political cam-
paign. Therefore, the respondent’s statements cannot 
be deemed as active and intended electoral campaign 
activities committed with an intention to have a parti-
cular candidate or certain identifiable candidates win or 
lose the election.
9. The ‘obligation to abide by and protect the Cons-
titution’ of  the President set forth in Articles 66(2) and 
69 of  the Constitution is the constitutional manifesta-
tion that specifies the constitutional principle of  gover-
nment by the rule of  law in relation to the President’s 
performance of  official duties. While the ‘obligation to 
abide by and protect the Constitution’ is a norm derived 
from the principle of  government by the rule of  law, 
the Constitution repeatedly emphasizes such obligation 
of  the President in Articles 66(2) and 69, considering 
the significance of  the status of  the President as the 
head of  the state and the chief  of  the executive branch. 
Under the spirit of  the Constitution as such, the Presi-
dent is the ‘symbolic existence personifying the rule of  
law and the observance of  law’ toward the entire public.
10. The President’s acts denigrating the current law 
as the ‘vestige of  the era of  the government-power-
-interfered elections’ and publicly questioning the cons-
titutionality and the legitimacy of  the statute from his 
status as the President do not conform to the obligation 
to abide by and protect the Constitution and statutes. 
The President, of  course, may express his or her own 
position and belief  regarding the direction for revising 
the current statute as a political figure. However, it is 
of  great importance that in which circumstances and 
in which relations such discussions on possible statu-
tory revisions take place. The President’s statements 
denigrating the current election statutes made as a res-
ponse to and in the context of  the National Election 
Commission’s warning for the president’s violation of  
such election statutes cannot be deemed as an attitude 
showing respect for the law.
The statements as such made by the President, who 
should serve as a good example for all public officials, 
might have significantly negative influence on the rea-
lization of  a government by the rule of  law, by grave-
ly affecting the other public officials obligated to res-
pect and abide by the law and, further, by lowering the 
public’s awareness to abide by the law. To conclude, the 
act of  the President questioning the legitimacy and the 
normative power of  the current statute in front of  the 
public is against the principle of  government by the rule 
of  law and is in violation of  the obligation to protect 
the Constitution.
11. The national referendum is a means to realize 
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direct democracy, and its object or subject matter is the 
‘decision on issues,’ that is, specific state policies or le-
gislative bills. Therefore, by the own nature of  the na-
tional referendum, the ‘confidence the public has in its 
representative’ cannot be a subject matter for a national 
referendum and the decision of  and the confidence in 
the representative under our Constitution may be per-
formed and manifested solely through elections.
The President’s suggestion to hold a national re-
ferendum on whether he should remain in office is an 
unconstitutional exercise of  the President’s authority to 
institute a national referendum delegated by Article 72 
of  the Constitution, and thus it is in violation of  the 
constitutional obligation not to abuse the mechanism of  
the national referendum as a political tool to fortify his 
own political position. Although the President merely su-
ggested an unconstitutional national referendum on the 
people’s confidence and did not yet actually institute such 
referendum, the suggestion toward the public of  a natio-
nal confidence referendum, which is not permitted under 
the Constitution, is itself  in violation of  Article 72 of  the 
Constitution and not in conformity with the president’s 
obligation to realize and protect the Constitution.
12. As Article 65(1) of  the Constitution provides ‘as 
the President, ... exercises his or her official duties’ and 
thereby limits the grounds for impeachment to the exer-
cise of  the ‘official duties,’ the above provision, as cons-
trued, mandates that only those acts of  violation of  law 
performed by the President while holding the office of  
the President may constitute the grounds for impeach-
ment. The alleged grounds for impeachment concer-
ning the unlawful political funds that involved the Sun 
& Moon corporation and the respondent’s presidential 
election camp are based on facts that arose before the 
respondent was elected and sworn in on February 25, 
2003 as the President. Therefore, such alleged grounds 
are clearly irrelevant to the respondent’s exercise of  his 
official duties as President and do not constitute groun-
ds for impeachment. With respect to the misconducts 
of  the President’s close associates and aides that took 
place subsequent to the respondent’s assumption of  the 
office of  President, none of  the evidence submitted 
to the bench throughout the entire proceedings in this 
case supports any finding that the respondent instruc-
ted or abetted the acts of  Choi Do-sul and others inclu-
ding receiving unlawful funds or was otherwise illegally 
involved in such acts. Therefore, the alleged grounds 
for impeachment based on the above facts are without 
merit.
13. Article 69 of  the Constitution provides for the 
President’s ‘obligation to faithfully perform the official 
duties,’ as it provides for the obligation of  the President 
to take the oath of  office. Although the ‘obligation to 
faithfully perform the official duties’ of  the President 
is a constitutional obligation, this obligation, by its own 
nature, is, unlike the ‘obligation to protect the Consti-
tution,’ not the one the performance of  which can be 
normatively enforced. As such, as a matter of  principle, 
this obligation cannot be a subject matter for a judicial 
adjudication.
As Article 65(1) of  the Constitution limits the 
ground for impeachment to the ‘violation of  the Cons-
titution or statutes’ and the impeachment adjudication 
process at the Constitutional Court is solely to deter-
mine the existence or the nonexistence of  a ground for 
impeachment from a legal standpoint, the ground for 
impeachment alleged by the petitioner in this case con-
cerning the respondent’s faithfulness of  the performan-
ce of  the official duties such as the political incapability 
or the mistake in policy decisions, cannot in and by itself  
constitute a ground for impeachment and therefore it is 
not a subject matter for an impeachment adjudication.
14. Article 53(1) of  the Constitutional Court Act 
provides that, “when there is a valid ground for the pe-
tition for impeachment adjudication, the Constitutional 
Court shall issue a decision removing the respondent 
from office.” The above provision may be interpreted 
literally to mean that the Constitutional Court shall au-
tomatically make a decision of  removal from office in all 
cases where there is any valid ground for impeachment 
as set forth in Article 65(1) of  the Constitution. Howe-
ver, if  every and any minor violation of  law committed 
in the course of  performing official duties were to man-
date removal from office, this would offend the request 
that punishment under the Constitution proportionally 
correspond to the obligation owed by the respondent, 
that is, the principle of  proportionality. Therefore, the 
‘valid ground for the petition for impeachment adjudi-
cation’ provided in Article 53(1) of  the Constitutional 
Court Act does not mean any and all incidence of  vio-
lation of  law, but the incidence of  a ‘grave’ violation 
of  law sufficient to justify removal of  a public official 
from office.
15. The question of  whether there was a ‘grave vio-
lation of  law’ or whether the ‘removal is justifiable’ can-
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not be conceived by itself. Therefore, the existence of  
a valid ground for the petition for impeachment adjudi-
cation, that is, the removal from office, should be deter-
mined by balancing the ‘degree of  the negative impact 
on or the harm to the constitutional order caused by 
the violation of  law’ and the ‘effect to be caused by the 
removal of  the respondent from office.’
On the other hand, a decision to remove the Pre-
sident from office would deprive the ‘democratic le-
gitimacy’ delegated to the President by the national 
constituents through an election during the term of  the 
office and may cause political chaos arising from the 
disruption of  the opinions among the people, that is, 
the disruption and the antagonism between those who 
support the President and those who do not, let alone 
a national loss and an interruption in state affairs from 
the discontinuity of  the performance of  presidential 
duties. Therefore, in light of  the gravity of  the effect to 
be caused by the removal of  the President, the ground 
to justify a decision of  removal should also possess cor-
responding gravity.
Although it is very difficult to provide in general ter-
ms which should constitute a ‘grave violation of  law 
sufficient to justify the removal of  the President from 
office,’ a decision to remove the President from office 
shall be justified in such limited circumstances as where 
the maintenance of  the presidential office can no longer 
be permitted from the standpoint of  the protection of  
the Constitution, or where the President has lost the 
qualifications to administrate state affairs by betraying 
the trust of  the people.
16. Considering the impact on the constitutional or-
der caused by the violations of  laws by the President as 
recognized in this case in its entirety, the specific acts of  
the President in violation of  law cannot be assessed as 
a threat to the basic order of  a free democracy as there 
is no finding of  an active intent to stand against the 
constitutional order therein.
The acts of  the President violating the laws were not 
grave in terms of  the protection of  the Constitution to 
the extent that it would require the protection of  the 
Constitution and the restoration of  the impaired cons-
titutional order by a decision to remove the President 
from office. Also, such acts of  the President cannot be 
deemed as acts that betrayed the trust of  the people to 
the extent that they would require the deprivation of  
the trust delegated to the President by the people prior 
to the completion of  the presidential term. Therefore, 
there is no valid ground sufficient to justify a decision 
to remove the President from office.
17. Article 34(1) of  the Constitutional Court Act 
provides that the deliberation of  the Constitutional 
Court shall not be public. Therefore, the separate opi-
nions of  the individual Justices may be noted in the de-
cision only when a special provision permits an excep-
tion to such secrecy of  deliberation proceedings. With 
respect to the impeachment adjudication, no provision 
for the exception to the secrecy of  deliberation exists. 
Therefore, in this impeachment adjudication, the sepa-
rate opinions of  the individual Justices or the numbers 
thereof  may not be noted in the decision.
However, it should be noted that concerning the 
above position, there was also a position that the ‘se-
parate opinions may be noted in the decision as Arti-
cle 36(3) of  the Act should be interpreted to leave the 
question of  whether to note individual opinions in an 
impeachment adjudication to the discretion of  the par-
ticipating justices.’
Parties
Petitioner
The Chair of  the Legislation and Judiciary Com-
mittee of  the National Assembly of  the Republic of  
Korea, on behalf  of  the National Assembly of  the Re-
public of  Korea
Counsel of  Record: Kang Jae-sup and 66 others
Respondent
Roh Moo-hyun, the President of  the Republic of  
Korea
Counsel of  Record: Ryu Hyun-seok and 9 others
Holding
The petition for the impeachment adjudication is 
rejected.
 
Reasoning
1. Overview of the Case and the Subject Matter 
of Review
A. Overview of the Case
(1) Resolution of  the impeachment and the petition 
for impeachment adjudication
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The National Assembly of  the Republic of  Korea 
proposed the ‘motion for the impeachment of  the Pre-
sident (Roh Moo-hyun)’ presented by Assembly mem-
bers Yoo Yong-tae and Hong Sa-deok and 157 others 
before the second plenary session at the 246th session 
(extraordinary) on March 12, 2004, and passed the 
motion by 193 concurrent votes out of  the entire As-
sembly membership of  271. The Chair of  the National 
Assembly Legislation and Judiciary Committee, Kim 
Ki-chun, acting ex officio as the petitioner, requested 
an impeachment adjudication against the respondent 
by submitting the attested original copy of  the impea-
chment resolution to the Constitutional Court on the 
same date pursuant to Article 49(2) of  the Constitutio-
nal Court Act.
The full text of  the National Assembly’s impeach-
ment resolution against the respondent is attached he-
reto as Appendix 3.
(2)Summary of the grounds for the impeachment 
resolution of the National Assembly
(A) Corrupting the national law and order
1) Act of supporting a particular political party
a) The respondent violated Articles 9(1), 60(1), 
85(1), 86(1) and 255(1) of  the Public Officials Election 
and Election Malpractice Prevention Act (hereinafter 
referred to as the ‘Public Officials Election Act’), in (i) 
stating, at a joint press conference with six news media 
organizations in the Seoul-Incheon region on February 
18, 2004, that “I simply cannot utter what will follow 
should the quorum to resist the constitutional revision 
be destroyed; and (ii) stating, as an invited guest at a 
press conference with the Korean Network Reporters 
Club on February 24, that “the public will make it clear 
whether I will be backed to do it well for the four years 
to come or I cannot stand it and will be forced to step 
down,” “I expect that the public will overwhelmingly 
support the Uri Party at the general election,” and “I 
would like to do anything that is legal if  it may lead to 
votes for the Uri Party.”
b) The respondent violated Articles 9(1), 59, and 87 
of  the Public Officials Election Act and Article 69 of  
the Constitution, in (i) stating, on December 19, 2003, 
when he participated in an event entitled “Remember 
1219” hosted by the so-called “Roh-Sa-Mo,” that “The 
citizens revolution is still going on. Let’s step forward 
once again”; and (ii) stating, at a meeting with the jour-
nalists in the Gangwon-Do region on February 5, 2004, 
that “the ‘Citizen Participation 0415(Kook-Cham 0415)’ 
members’ participation in politics should be permitted 
and encouraged legally and politically.”
c) Pursuant to the report in Joong-Ang Ilbo on Fe-
bruary 27, 2004, the document entitled ‘the strategic 
planning of  the Uri Party for the 17th General Election’ 
states that it is necessary to ‘establish the control tower 
where the party, the administration, and Cheong Wa 
Dae (the Office of  the President) together participate’ 
in order to invite the candidates for the general election, 
and lists ‘the partyCheong Wa Dae-the administration’ 
in the order of  importance in the administration of  the 
state affairs for the general election. This confirms the 
organizational intervention into the election by Cheong 
Wa Dae, and the command of  the strategy of  a particu-
lar political party for the general election by the respon-
dent was in violation of  Articles 9(1) and 86(1)(ii) of  the 
Public Officials Election Act.
d) The respondent violated Article 9(1) of  the Pu-
blic Officials Election Act and Articles 8(3) and 11(1) 
of  the Constitution, in (i) stating, at a beginning-of-the-
-year press conference on January 14, 2004, that “the-
re was a split because there were those who supported 
reform and those who did not support reform fearing 
it, and I would like to go together with the Uri Party as 
those who supported me at the presidential election are 
running the Uri Party”; and (ii) stating, at a gathering 
with the close associates on December 24, 2003, that 
“if  you vote for the New Millennium Democratic Party, 
you are helping the Grand National Party.”
e) The respondent violated Article 237(1)(iii) of  the 
Public Officials Election Act and Articles 10, 19 and 
24 of  the Constitution, in inducing the support for a 
particular political party by threatening the public and in 
repeatedly making remarks affecting the public’s mind 
concerning the general election.
2) Act in contempt of the constitutional institu-
tions
a) The respondent violated Articles 66(2), 69 and 
78 of  the Constitution and Article 7(1) of  the National 
Intelligence Service Act, in ignoring the impropriety re-
commendation by the National Assembly Confirmation 
Hearing Committee on April 25, 2003, for Ko Young-
-gu, as the head of  the National Intelligence Service.
b) The respondent violated Articles 66(2) and 69 
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of  the Constitution, Article 63 of  the National Public 
Official Act, and Article 311 of  the Criminal Code, in 
describing the then incumbent members of  the Natio-
nal Assembly as ‘weeds to be mowed’ in his open letter 
to the public via the Internet on May 8, 2003.
c) The respondent violated Articles 63(1), 66(2) 
and 69 of  the Constitution, in taking the position that 
seemed to refuse the National Assembly resolution of  
September 3, 2003 that proposed the removal of  Kim 
Doo-kwan from the office of  the Minister of  Govern-
ment Administration and Home Affairs, by postponing 
the acceptance of  such resolution.
d) The respondent violated Articles 40, 66(2), and 
69 of  the Constitution, in (i) expressing regrettable-
ness on March 4, 2004 towards the National Election 
Commission’s decision requesting the President to ob-
serve the neutrality obligation concerning elections, 
through the Senior Secretary to the President for Public 
Information; (ii) denigrating the current election laws, 
on the same date, as the ‘vestige of  the era of  the gover-
nment-power-interfered-elections’; and, (iii) on March 
8, devaluating his violation of  Article 9 of  the Public 
Officials Election Act as ‘miscellaneous’ and ‘minor and 
equivocal.’
e) The respondent violated Articles 65(1), 66(2) and 
69 of  the Constitution, in stating on March 8, 2004 that 
the National Assembly’s moving forward on the impea-
chment proposal was an ‘unjust oppression.’
f) The respondent violated Articles 66(2), 69 and 72 
of  the Constitution, in stating at a press conference on 
October 10, 2003 that, with respect to the suspicion as 
to Choi Do-sul’s reception of  the secret fund from the 
SK Group, “when the investigation closes, I will ask the 
public the confidence in the President concerning the 
public distrust accumulated during the past including 
this matter”; and stating at the policy speech on the sta-
te affairs at the National Assembly on October 13 that 
“the vote of  confidence will be feasible even under the 
current law upon reaching a political agreement althou-
gh there are some legal arguments upon it,” “although 
a way to associate the vote of  confidence with certain 
policies is under discussion, it would rather not be done 
that way and none of  the conditions will be attached,” 
and “if  I win the vote of  confidence, I plan to reorgani-
ze the cabinet and Cheong Wa Dae within this year and 
to carry out reform to state affairs.”
(B) Power-engendered corruption
1) Act of receiving illegal political funds concer-
ning the Sun & Moon Group
a) In June 2002, the respondent had Ahn Hee-jung 
request the National Tax Service to reduce the taxes for 
the Sun & Moon Group (CEO, Moon Byung-wook), 
whereby the taxes for the Sun & Moon Group was re-
duced to 2.3 billion Korean Won from 17.1 billion Ko-
rean Won. This was in violation of  Article 129(2) of  the 
Criminal Code and Article 3 of  the Enhanced Punish-
ments for the Specified Crimes Act.
b) The respondent had a breakfast meeting with 
Moon Byung-wook on November9, 2002 at Riz Carlton 
in Seoul, for which Lee Gwang-jae acted as an agent. 
Immediately after the respondent left the breakfast 
meeting, Lee Gwang-jae received 100 million Korean 
Won from Moon Byung-wook. This was in violation of  
Article 30 of  the Political Fund Act (hereinafter refer-
red to as the ‘Fund Act’) and Article 32 of  the Criminal 
Code.
c) The respondent violated Article 129 of  the Cri-
minal Code, Article 61 of  the State Public Officials Act, 
and Article 30 of  the Fund Act, in receiving two packa-
ges of  money (presumed to be approximately 100 mi-
llion Korean Won) from Moon Byung-wook at Kimhae 
Tourists Hotel on July 7, 2002 and forwarding it to his 
accompanying secretary Yeo Taek-soo.
2) Receiving illegal political fund concerning the 
presidential election camp
In Roh Moo-hyun’s presidential election camp, 
Chung Dae-chul, the chief  of  the Joint Election Stra-
tegy Committee, received 900 million Korean Won, 
Lee Sang-soo, the General Affairs Director, received 
700 million Korean Won, and Lee Jae-jung, the Cam-
paign Headquarter Director, received 1 billion Korean 
Won, of  illegal political fund, all of  which was forwar-
ded to Roh Moo-hyun’s presidential election camp. The 
respondent’s involvement in the above transactions was 
in violation of  Article 30 of  the Fund Act.
3) Involvement in the corruption of close asso-
ciates
a) Corruption concerning Choi Do-sul
Choi Do-sul (i) embezzled 250 million Korean Won 
and delivered the funds to Sun Bong-sul, the CEO of  the 
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Jang-Soo-Cheon company, in May 2002, which were the 
remaining funds in the account belonging to the New Mi-
llennium Democratic Party Election Committee Busan 
Branch as the balance from the local elections, in order 
to pay the obligation owed by the respondent concerning 
the Jang-Soo-Cheon company; (ii) collected illegal funds 
in the amount of  500 million Korean Won and delivered 
such funds to Sun Bong-sul for the period of  December 
2002 to February 6, 2003, in order to pay the obligation 
owed to Jang-Soo-cheon; (iii) received illegal funds in the 
amount of  100 million Korean Won through an account 
under an assumed name for the period of  March to April 
of  2002, in order to create funds for the presidential can-
didacy nomination of  the respondent; (iv) received illegal 
funds in the amount of  296.5 million Korean Won from 
the Nexen Tire company and others after the presidential 
election; (v) received 47 million Korean Won from Sam-
sung and others during his office as the General Affairs 
Secretary for the President; (vi) received negotiable certi-
ficates of  deposits from the SK Group in the amount of  
approximately 1.1 billion Korean Won immediately after 
the presidential election. The above acts of  Choi Do-
-sul were impossible without the respondent’s direction 
or tacit permission. Therefore, such acts of  the respon-
dent were in violation of  Article 61(1) of  the State Public 
Officials Act, Article 30 of  the Fund Act, Article 3 of  the 
Act of  Regulation and Punishment for the Concealment 
of  Criminally Gained Profit, and Articles 31, 32, 129 and 
356 of  the Criminal Code.
b) Corruption concerning Ahn Hee-jung
(i) Between August 29, 2002 and February 2003, 
Kang Geum-won provided 1.9 billion Korean Won of  
illegal funds by way of  a disguised sale and purchase of  
real estate owned by Lee Gi-myung; (ii) Ahn Hee-jung 
collected 790 million Korean Won of  illegal funds from 
September through December of  2002 and delivered 
such funds to Sun Bong-sul and others; and (iii) Ahn 
Hee-jung received 50 million Korean Won of  illegal 
funds at the time of  the presidential candidacy nomi-
nation process, 3 billion Korean Won of  illegal funds 
from Samsung at the time of  the presidential election, 
and 1 billion Korean Won of  illegal funds between Mar-
ch and August of  2003. The respondent violated Arti-
cle 2 of  the Enhanced Punishments for the Specified 
Crimes Act, Article 61(1) of  the State Public Officials 
Act, Article 30 of  the Fund Act, and Articles 31 and 32 
of  the Criminal Code, as the respondent directed and 
abetted the above acts.
c) Corruption concerning Yeo Taek-soo
Yeo Taek-soo received 300 million Korean Won of  
illegal funds from the Lotte Group and provided 200 
million Korean Won out of  such funds for the forma-
tion of  the Uri Party during his office as an administra-
tive officer at Cheong Wa Dae. The respondent violated 
Article 61(1) of  the State Public Officials Act, Article 
30 of  the Funds Act, and Articles 31, 32 and 129 of  
the Criminal Code, as the respondent was involved in 
such acts.
d) Corruption concerning Yang Gil-seung
Yang Gil-seung, who was the Chief  of  Personal Se-
cretary Office for the President, was arrested in June 
of  2003 for allegedly having requested to suspend the 
investigation in return for a lavish entertainment at the 
expense of  Lee Won-ho, who was then under investiga-
tion for an alleged tax evasion.
4) Public remarks as to the retirement from po-
litics
The respondent publically made remarks at the party 
representative meeting at Cheong Wa Dae on Decem-
ber 14, 2003 that the respondent would retire from po-
litics should the amount of  illegal political funds on the 
part of  the respondent exceed one-tenth of  that of  the 
Grand National Party. The respondent, however, igno-
red such public promise of  political retirement althou-
gh the result of  the public prosecutors office’s investi-
gation indicates that the amount reached one seventh 
as of  March 8, 2004. The respondent thereby violated 
Article 69 of  the Constitution, Article 63 of  the State 
Public Officials Act, and Article 30 of  the Fund Act.
(C) Disruption of the National Administration
The respondent violated Articles 10 and 69 of  the 
Constitution in disrupting the public and drowning the 
economy into a rupture, notwithstanding his constitu-
tionally mandated obligation as the head of  the state and 
the ultimately responsible party of  the national adminis-
tration to sincerely endeavor to protect the public’s right 
to pursue happiness and to increase the public welfare 
by uniting the public and consolidating the whole capa-
city for the nation’s development and economic growth, 
by failing to maintain integrity in the policy goals be-
tween growth and distribution, by increasing uncertain-
ty at the industry from oscillating without clear policy 
directions regarding the right-obligation relationship of  
the labor and the management, by exacerbating econo-
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mic instability from causing confusion and theoretical 
enmity among the policy administrators, by having un-
faithfully performed his office in, for example, pouring 
all his authority and effort in for a particular political 
party’s victory at the general election, and by irrespon-
sibly and recklessly administering the national affairs in, 
for example, making a remark that “the presidency is 
too damn much trouble to do,” proposing a confidence 
vote, and declaring his retirement from politics.
B. Subject Matter of Review
(1) The subject matters of  review in the instant case 
are whether the President violated the constitution or 
statutes in performing his duties and whether the Presi-
dent should be removed from office by the issuance of  
the Constitutional Court’s order as such.
(2) The Constitutional Court, as a judicial institu-
tion, is restrained in principle to the grounds for impea-
chment stated in the National Assembly’s impeachment 
resolution. Therefore, no other grounds for impeach-
ment except those stated in the impeachment resolution 
constitute the subject matter to be adjudicated by the 
Constitutional Court at the impeachment adjudication 
proceeding.
However, with respect to the ‘determination on le-
gal provisions,’ the violation of  which is alleged in the 
impeachment resolution, the Constitutional Court in 
principle is not bound thereby. Therefore, the Consti-
tutional Court may determine the facts that led to the 
impeachment based on other relevant legal provisions 
as well as the legal provisions which the petitioner alle-
ges have been violated. Also, the Constitutional Court 
is not bound by the structure of  the grounds for im-
peachment as categorized by the National Assembly in 
its impeachment resolution in determining the grounds 
for impeachment. Therefore, the question of  in which 
relations the grounds for impeachment are legally exa-
mined is absolutely to be determined by the Constitu-
tional Court.
2. Summary of the Impeaching Petitioner’s Argu-
ment and the Respondent’s Answer
A. Summary of the Argument of the Impeaching 
Petitioner
(1) Not only an act of  a public official in violation 
of  the provisions of  the Constitution or statutes in the 
performance of  his or her official duties, but also im-
morality concerning the performance of  the office or 
the political incapability and the error in political deci-
sionmaking, constitutes the grounds for impeachment. 
The grounds for impeachment are “all” acts in violation 
of  the Constitution and statutes in the performance 
of  his or her official duties and are not limited to only 
“grave” violations. Even if  it is necessary to limit the 
grounds for impeachment to an ‘act of  grave violation’ 
in order to prevent abuse of  the impeachment system, it 
is manifest that a violation of  the constitutionally man-
dated obligation or an unfaithful performance of  the 
official duties by the President, unlike other acts of  vio-
lation, constitutes a grave violation of  the Constitution 
or statutes.
Also, an act prior to inauguration as President may 
constitute a ground for impeachment.
(2)The authority to determine whether an act of  the 
President in violation of  the Constitution or statutes in 
the performance of  his or her official duties is of  such 
gravity to justify the removal from the office lies in the 
National Assembly directly constituted by the national 
constituents. The scope of  the subject matter in the im-
peachment adjudication proceeding at the Constitutio-
nal Court is limited to the question of  the constitutio-
nality and legality of  the impeachment procedures and 
to the question of  whether or not the specific violations 
that allegedly constitute the grounds for impeachment 
in fact exist.
(3) The respondent, both prior to and following the 
inauguration as President, continuously and repeatedly 
made remarks that cast a doubt on his qualification as 
President and his will to preserve the basic order of  
free democracy and instigated the disintegration of  
the national opinions. Also, the respondent impeded 
the political neutrality and independence of  the public 
prosecutors’ office by intervening into or pressuring 
the investigation process. The respondent continuously 
performed an illegal election campaign for a particular 
political party, upon which the constitutional institution 
of  the National Election Commission determined, as 
unprecedented in the constitutional history for an in-
cumbent president, that the respondent was in violation 
of  the Public Officials Election Act, and the decision 
and the accompanying warning were announced to the 
respondent on March 3, 2004. Notwithstanding, igno-
ring such warning, the respondent has taken an anti-
-constitutional position directly denying the rule of  law 
by declaring that he would also publicly support a par-
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ticular political party in the future irrespective of  the 
election law.
Also, the respondent violated various statutes such 
as Article 30 of  the Political Funds Act (punishing the 
act of  receiving illegal political funds), Articles 123 (abu-
se of  office) and 129 (bribery) of  the Criminal Code, in 
getting directly and indirectly involved with numerous 
incidents of  receiving illegal funds and embezzlement 
by his close associates prior to and following his win-
ning the presidential election. The respondent violated 
the Constitution and statutes such as Article 69 of  the 
Constitution (obligation to abide by the Constitution), 
in suggesting, concerning certain corruption matters 
involving his close associates, a national referendum 
whether he should remain in office, which is not per-
mitted under the Constitution, and, concerning illegal 
funds for the presidential election, in publicly declaring 
that he would retire from politics had such illegal fun-
ds been in excess of  certain amount and then ignoring 
such promise.
Furthermore, although the respondent, as the presi-
dent of  a nation, should endeavor to unify the nation, 
to develop economy, and to promote public welfare, the 
respondent, abandoning such constitutionally manda-
ted obligations, disintegrated the national opinions by 
making statements that instigated antagonism and jea-
lousy among various classes in our society, exacerbated 
economic instability by uncertain policy goals between 
‘growth and distribution’ and confusion among the po-
licy administrators, and led the national economy and 
the people’s livelihood into distress by causing econo-
mic stagnation and large-scale unemployment among 
the younger generation thus returning to the public 
agony and misery harsher than that during the IMF 
foreign-currency crisis, thereby violated Articles 10 (the 
obligation to protect the public’s right to pursue hap-
piness) and 69 (the obligation to faithfully perform the 
office in order to promote the public welfare) of  the 
Constitution.
The National Assembly, as the above can no lon-
ger be tolerated, unavoidably, in order for the happiness 
of  the public and the future of  the nation, reached the 
resolution to impeach the President, which is the sole 
means under the current Constitution to directly hold 
responsible and check the President against misrulings 
in violation of  the Constitution and statutes.
B. Summary of the Respondent’s Answer
(1) On the Question of Legal Prerequisites
It is the abuse of  the impeachment authority by the 
National Assembly that, in the instant case, the Natio-
nal Assembly hastily resolved to impeach the President 
while no sufficient grounds or evidence for impeach-
ment existed, thereby suspending the authority of  the 
President, and it attempts to inquire into the grounds 
and the evidence for impeachment through the adjudi-
cation procedure at the Constitutional Court.
The Grand National Party and the New Millennium 
Democratic Party threatened to oust party-member as-
semblypersons should they not participate in the im-
peachment resolution. The assemblypersons who parti-
cipated in the resolution process did a public vote with 
no curtain hung at the voting booth, with certain assem-
blypersons showing their marked votes to the whip of  
the party to which they belonged. Also, the Speaker of  
the National Assembly voted by proxy.
The Speaker of  the National Assembly unilaterally 
changed the time when the general meeting would open 
from 2 o’clock in the afternoon to 10 o’clock in the 
morning, without consulting the representative mem-
ber of  the Uri Party, which is a negotiating party of  the 
National Assembly.
The Speaker of  the National Assembly impeded the 
voting rights of  the assemblypersons who were mem-
bers of  the Uri Party, by hastily declaring the closure of  
the vote upon completion of  vote by the assemblyper-
sons belonging to the Grand National Party, the New 
Millennium Democratic Party and the United Liberal 
Democrats, without cautiously assessing the circums-
tances regarding whether the assemblypersons belon-
ging to the Uri Party would participate in voting.
The Speaker of  the National Assembly impeded the 
right of  assemblypersons to inquire and discuss in vio-
lation of  Article 93 of  the National Assembly Act, by 
foregoing the procedure of  explaining the purpose but 
instead distributing the printed materials, and by forcing 
the vote without any procedure for inquiry and discus-
sion, in the deliberation process for the impeachment 
motion.
The National Assembly violated the Constitution by 
impeding the right of  assemblypersons to inquire and 
discuss, in passing the impeachment motion as a single 
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measure by way of  a single vote, without going through 
the procedures to inquire and discuss and to vote indivi-
dually on each of  the three stated grounds for impeach-
ment, while the impeachment resolution in the instant 
case contains three distinct grounds for impeachment 
against the respondent.
The resolution on the impeachment is in violation 
of  due process as the respondent was not provided with 
any notice or opportunity to state his opinion at the im-
peachment process in the National Assembly.
(2) On the Merit of the Case
The authority to impeach the President and the au-
thority to adjudicate thereon should be exercised with 
utmost caution within the boundary of  checks and 
balances under the principle of  separation of  powers. 
The ‘violation of  the Constitution or statutes in per-
forming official duties’ provided in Article 65(1) of  the 
Constitution is too vague to indicate which types of  act 
of  violation rendered in which method are subject to 
impeachment. Considering the systematic and practical 
dynamics surrounding the constitutional institutions 
and the fundamental order and the value ordained by 
the Constitution, the grounds for impeachment against 
the President should correctly be limited to ‘grave and 
apparent violation of  the Constitution and statutes dee-
med to impede upon the constitutional values and the 
constitutional fundamental order.’
The impeachment resolution in the instant case was 
reached by a National Assembly that has practically lost 
democratic legitimacy, with the termination of  its term 
fast approaching, in pursuit of  party interest and impul-
se beyond its authority delegated by the public; and was 
hastily processed even though there was no substantive 
ground that would justify impeachment, without careful 
investigation and deliberation, democratic discussion, 
or any process to persuade the public.
With respect to the first alleged ground for impea-
chment entitled the ‘violation of  the election law,’ the 
President is a public officer of  a political nature who 
is permitted to be a member of  a political party and 
Article 9 of  the Public Officials Election Act cannot 
be applied to the President. Even if  not, the statements 
at issue herein are not deemed to be in violation of  the 
Public Officials Election Act.
With respect to the second alleged ground for im-
peachment entitled the ‘corruption of  the respondent’s 
close associates and aides,’ many of  the alleged facts 
occurred prior to the respondent’s inauguration as Pre-
sident, and the respondent was neither involved in the 
alleged corruption by, for example, directing or abetting 
such alleged acts, nor has the respondent’s involvement 
been proven, therefore, such alleged acts under this 
count do not constitute a ground for impeachment.
With respect to the third alleged ground for impea-
chment entitled the ‘disruption of  the national admi-
nistration,’ the allegation is different from the fact, and, 
even if  true, the political incapacity or the misjudgment 
in policymaking of  the President does not constitute a 
ground for impeachment.
3. Review of the Legality of the National Assem-
bly’s Impeachment
A. National Assembly’s Authority to Self-Regula-
te its Deliberation Proceedings
The National Assembly, as the representative of  the 
public and as the legislative body, possesses vast au-
thority to self-regulate its administration, including its 
deliberation process and internal regulation. This self-
-regulating authority should be respected in light of  the 
doctrine of  separation of  powers and the status and 
the function of  the National Assembly, as long as the-
re is no clear violation of  the Constitution or statutes 
in the deliberative or legislative process of  the Natio-
nal Assembly. Therefore, it is not desirable for other 
state institutions to intervene and judge the legitimacy 
of  a decision reached by the National Assembly upon 
matters that fall within the scope of  its self-regulating 
authority, and no exception thereto applies to the Cons-
titutional Court (See 10-2 KCCR 74, 83, 98Hun-Ra3, 
July 14, 1998).
Also, the Speaker of  the National Assembly is, in 
principle, vested with the general and inclusive authority 
and responsibility concerning the deliberation process 
of  the National Assembly, pursuant to Article 10 of  the 
National Assembly Act. Therefore, in cases of  disputes 
as to the deliberation process at the general meeting or 
where the normal deliberative process otherwise can-
not apply, the method of  deliberation and of  resolu-
tion is to be determined by the Speaker of  the National 
Assembly within the above authority endowed to the 
Speaker. Such authority of  the Speaker to preside over 
the deliberation process is, widely interpreted, part of  
the self-regulating authority of  the National Assembly, 
and should be respected as such unless exercised in a 
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way clearly beyond its limit. As a principle, such autho-
rity may not be impeded upon by the Constitutional 
Court (See 12-1 KCCR 115, 128, 99Hun-Ra1, February 
24, 2000).
B. On the argument that the proceedings at the 
National Assembly lacked sufficient investiga-
tion and deliberation
The respondent argues that in order for the Natio-
nal Assembly to petition for the impeachment of  the 
President, the National Assembly must sufficiently in-
vestigate the grounds for impeachment and the eviden-
ce thereto, to the extent that the Constitutional Court 
in its impeachment adjudication can readily determine 
the validity of  the alleged grounds for impeachment. 
It is desirable, as a matter of  course, that the Natio-
nal Assembly thoroughly investigate the stated grounds 
for impeachment prior to its reaching a resolution to 
impeach. However, Article 130(1) of  the National As-
sembly Act provides that, “upon proposal for the im-
peachment resolution, ... the National Assembly may, 
by resolution at the plenary session, assign the matter 
to the Legislation and Judiciary Committee for investi-
gation,” thus subjects the investigation to the discretion 
of  the National Assembly. Therefore, even if  the Natio-
nal Assembly did not perform a separate investigation 
in the instant case, this was not in violation of  the Cons-
titution or statutes.
C. On the arguments of the forced voting, the 
non-secret vote, and the proxy vote for the Spe-
aker of the National Assembly
(1) Even if  the Grand National Party and the New 
Millennium Democratic Party publicly declared that 
they “will oust from the party those assemblypersons 
who will not participate in the vote for the impeachment 
measure,” this cannot be deemed as pressure or threat 
substantively preventing the assemblypersons from 
exercising their voting right pursuant to their conscien-
ce (Article 46(2) of  the Constitution, and Article 114-2 
of  the National Assembly Act) beyond the boundaries 
of  the party control permissible under today’s party de-
mocracy.
(2) Even if  it was true that the screen at the voting 
booth was not pulled down at the time of  voting or 
certain assemblypersons disclosed the content of  their 
votes to the party whip of  their respective party mem-
bership, the question of  the effect of  such on the validi-
ty of  the voting at the National Assembly is a matter for 
which the decision of  the National Assembly, with its 
self-regulating authority regarding the deliberation pro-
cess, should be respected. The Speaker of  the National 
Assembly confirmed the validity of  the votes, thereby, 
declaring the passing of  the impeachment resolution, 
and there is no clear basis or materials indicating a pa-
tent violation of  the Constitution or statutes. Therefo-
re, the Constitutional Court may not deny the effect of  
the votes on or the passing of  the impeachment resolu-
tion, solely on these alleged facts.
(3) With respect to the argument that the Speaker of  
the National Assembly voted by proxy, voting by pro-
xy means that ‘someone does not mark the vote and, 
instead, has a third party mark the vote on his or her 
behalf.’ The acknowledged facts here merely indicate 
that the Speaker of  the National Assembly, pursuant to 
the custom within the National Assembly, marked the 
vote himself  from the seat reserved for the Speaker, fol-
ded the voting paper to secure the content of  the vote 
from disclosure to others, and forwarded such voting 
paper to an officer so that the officer put the vote into 
the ballot box. Therefore, there was no vote by proxy.
D. On the argument that the opening time for 
the National Assembly general meeting was ar-
bitrarily changed
The National Assembly Act, with respect to the 
opening time for its meetings and sessions, provides 
in Article 72 that the “meeting of  the plenary session 
shall be opened at two o’clock p.m. (on Saturday, at ten 
o’clock a.m.): provided, That the Speaker may change 
the opening time after consulting with the representati-
ve assemblyperson of  each negotiating party,” thereby 
providing that a change of  the opening time shall be 
subject to the consultation with the representing assem-
blyperson of  each negotiation party.
The ‘consultation’ here may occur in various forms, 
by its nature, as the process for exchanging and recei-
ving opinions, and the Speaker of  the National Assem-
bly makes the final judgment and decision upon matters 
regarding such consultation. In the instant case, consi-
dering that a normal deliberation process pursuant to 
the National Assembly Act was hardly anticipated due 
to the continuous occupation of  the floor for the ge-
neral meeting by the assemblypersons of  the Uri Party 
notwithstanding the fact that the impeachment motion 
was to be discarded past March 12, 2004 for the expira-
tion of  the time limit, and further considering that the 
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prevailing majority of  the assemblypersons, including 
the assemblypersons of  the Uri Party, were present at 
the designated venue when the general meeting at issue 
was opened at approximately 11:22 on March 12, 2004, 
the mere fact that the Representative Assemblyperson 
of  the Uri Party and the Speaker of  the National As-
sembly did not directly discuss the opening time cannot, 
by itself, be deemed as a violation of  Article 72 of  the 
National Assembly Act or as an infringement on the 
right of  assemblypersons of  the Uri Party membership 
to examine and vote.
E. On the argument that the voting was unilate-
rally declared to be closed
The respondent alleges that the Speaker of  the Na-
tional Assembly unilaterally declared that the voting was 
closed disregarding whether or not the assemblypersons 
of  the Uri Party would intend to participate in voting. 
However, the minutes of  the National Assembly general 
meeting for March 12, 2004 indicate that the Speaker, at 
that time, urged two or three times those who had not 
yet voted to participate in voting and declared that the 
voting would be closed should there be no more votes. 
It cannot be, then, deemed that the Speaker of  the Na-
tional Assembly obstructed the Uri Party assemblyper-
sons from exercising their voting rights by unilaterally 
closing the voting.
F. On the argument that the inquiry and discus-
sion process was lacking
The respondent argues that the forcefully performed 
voting with a mere distribution of  the printed materials 
instead of  the explanation of  the purpose by the as-
semblyperson who proposed the impeachment motion, 
without any inquiry or discussion process, in violation 
of  Article 93 of  the National Assembly Act, impeded 
the assemblypersons’ right to inquire and discuss.
Article 93 of  the National Assembly Act provides 
that, ‘with respect to such subject matters which have 
not been examined by a committee, the proponent of  
such matter should explain its purpose.’ The above mi-
nutes of  the National Assembly general meeting indica-
te that, in the deliberation process for the impeachment 
motion in the instant case, a ‘document’ was substituted 
for the proponent’s explanation of  the purpose. There 
is no legal ground to deem this method as inappropriate.
Next, on the argument that the inquiry and discus-
sion process was lacking, as Article 93 of  the Natio-
nal Assembly Act provides that the ‘general meeting, 
in deliberating the subject matters before it, shall vote 
upon inquiry and discussion,’ it would have been desira-
ble, in light of  the significance of  the impeachment, if  
the National Assembly had rendered sufficient inquiry 
and discussion within the National Assembly. However, 
with respect to the proposed impeachment motion not 
sent to the Legislation and Judiciary Committee, Article 
130(2) of  the National Assembly Act stipulating that 
“a secret vote shall be taken to determine whether to 
pass an impeachment motion between 24 and 72 hours 
after the motion is reported to the plenary session” can 
be deemed as a special provision concerning the im-
peachment procedure and may be interpreted to mean 
that the ‘impeachment motion may be put to a vote wi-
thout inquiry and discussion.’ With the self-regulating 
authority and the legal interpretation of  the National 
Assembly to be respected, such interpretation of  the 
law cannot be deemed as arbitrary or incorrect.
G. On the argument that each ground for im-
peachment was not separately voted on
In voting to decide whether to pass an impeachment 
resolution, it would be desirable to vote on each of  the 
stated grounds for impeachment separately, in order to 
appropriately protect the right to vote of  the assem-
blypersons. However, the National Assembly Act does 
not contain any express provision regarding such and 
merely provides in Article 110 that the Speaker of  the 
National Assembly should declare the title of  the sub-
ject matter that is to be voted on. Pursuant to the above 
provision, the scope of  the subject matter to be voted 
on varies depending upon how the title of  the subject 
matter is determined. Thus, whether or not more than 
one ground for impeachment may be voted on as a sin-
gle matter is, basically, up to the Speaker of  the National 
Assembly who has the authority to determine the title 
of  the subject matter that is to be voted on. Therefore, 
the argument raised by the respondent in this regard 
lacks merit.
H. On the argument that the principle of due 
process was violated
The respondent argues that the impeachment reso-
lution in the instant case was in violation of  the princi-
ple of  due process since the respondent had not been 
officially notified of  the facts allegedly constituting the 
grounds for impeachment nor had the respondent been 
provided with an opportunity to state his own opinions.
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The principle of  due process here, as the respondent 
argues, is the legal principle that before the state autho-
rity makes a decision prejudicing its citizen, such citizen 
should be provided with an opportunity to state his or 
her own opinions, and should thereby be able to affect 
the progress of  the procedure and the result thereof. 
The citizen is not a mere object of  the state authority 
but the subject of  the process and only when a citizen 
may state his or her own opinions prior to a decision 
concerning his or her own right can an objective and 
fair procedure be guaranteed and the equality of  status 
in the procedure between the parties realized.
In the instant case, however, the impeachment 
procedures at the National Assembly concern the re-
lationship between two constitutional institutions, the 
National Assembly and the President, and the impea-
chment resolution by the National Assembly merely 
suspends the exercise of  the authority vested in the 
President as a state institution and does not infringe 
the basic rights of  the President as a private individual. 
Therefore, the due process principle that has been for-
med as a legal principle applicable in the exercise of  
the governmental power by the state institution in its 
relationship with its citizens shall not be directly appli-
cable in the impeachment proceeding that is designed 
to protect the Constitution against a state institution. 
Furthermore, there is no express provision of  law con-
cerning the impeachment proceeding that requires an 
opportunity to be heard for the respondent. Therefore, 
the argument that the impeachment proceeding at the 
National Assembly was in violation of  the due process 
principle is groundless.
4. Nature of the impeachment adjudication pro-
cedure in Article 65 of the Constitution and the 
grounds for impeachment
A. The impeachment adjudication procedure is 
a system designed to protect and maintain the 
Constitution from infringement by highranking 
public officials of the executive and judicial 
branches.
 Article 65 of  the Constitution provides for the pos-
sibility of  impeachment of  high-ranking public officials 
of  the executive branch and the judiciary for violation 
of  the Constitution or statutes. It thereby functions as a 
warning to such public officials not to violate the Cons-
titution and thus also prevents such violations. Further, 
where certain public officials are delegated with state 
authority by the citizenry but abuse such authority to 
violate the Constitution or statutes, the impeachment 
process functions to deprive them of  such authority. 
That is, reinforcing the normative power of  the Consti-
tution by holding certain public officials legally respon-
sible for their violation of  the Constitution in exercising 
their official duties is the purpose and the function of  
the impeachment adjudication process.
Article 65 of  the Constitution includes the President 
in the definition of  public officials who are subject to 
impeachment, memorializing a discerned position that 
even the President elected by the public and thereby 
directly endowed with democratic legitimacy may be 
impeached in order for the preservation of  the consti-
tutional order and that the considerable political chaos 
that may be caused by a decision to remove the Presi-
dent from office should be deemed as an inevitable cost 
of  democracy in order for the national community to 
protect the basic order of  free democracy. The system 
subjecting the President to the possibility of  impeach-
ment, thus realizes the principle of  the rule of  law or a 
state governed by law that every person is under the law 
and no possessor of  the state power, however mighty, 
is above the law.
Our Constitution, in order to fulfill the function 
of  the impeachment adjudication process as a process 
dedicated to the preservation of  the Constitution, ex-
pressly provides in Article 65 that the ground for im-
peachment shall be a ‘violation of  the Constitution or 
statutes’ and mandates the Constitutional Court to take 
charge of  the impeachment adjudication, thereby indi-
cating that the purpose of  the impeachment system lies 
in the removal of  the President ‘not for political groun-
ds but for violations of  law.’
B. The Constitution, in Article 65(1), provides for 
the grounds of impeachment that “the National 
Assembly may resolve to impeach the President, 
... upon violation of the Constitution or statutes 
by the President, ... in performing official duties.”
(1) All state institutions are bound by the Consti-
tution. Especially, the legislator should abide by the 
Constitution in the legislative process and the executive 
branch and the judicial branch are bound by the Cons-
titution in exercising the state authority vested by and 
under the Constitution. Article 65 of  the Constitution 
reemphasizes that the state institutions of  the executive 
and the judicial branches are bound by the Constitu-
P
Á
D
U
A
, T
h
ia
go
 A
gu
ia
r;
 G
U
E
D
E
S,
 J
ef
fe
rs
o
n
 C
ar
ús
. A
lg
um
as
 R
efl
ex
õ
es
 s
o
b
re
 a
s 
L
in
h
as
 d
e 
F
o
rç
a 
e 
as
 L
im
it
aç
õ
es
 C
o
n
st
it
uc
io
n
ai
s 
do
 I
m
p
ed
im
en
to
 P
re
si
de
n
ci
al
: o
 c
as
o
 S
ul
-C
o
re
an
o
 d
e 
20
04
. U
n
iv
er
si
ta
s 
Ju
s,
 B
ra
sí
lia
, v
. 2
7,
 n
. 3
, 2
01
6 
p.
 1
7-
62
44
tion and statutes, and, on this very ground, sets forth 
the grounds for impeachment to be the violation of  the 
Constitution and statutes, not limiting the grounds me-
rely to the violation of  the Constitution. The question 
of  whether the executive branch and the judicial branch 
abide by the statutes formed by the legislative branch is 
directly related to the question of  their compliance with 
the doctrine of  separation of  powers and the principle 
of  the rule of  law under the Constitution. Therefore, 
observance of  the statutes by the executive and the judi-
cial branches means, in turn, their compliance with the 
constitutional order.
(2) An analysis of  the specific grounds for impea-
chment set forth in Article 65 of  the Constitution here 
reveals that the ‘official duties’ as provided in ‘exercising 
the official duties’ mean the duties that are inherent in 
particular governmental offices as provided by law and 
also other duties related thereto as commonly unders-
tood. Therefore, acts in exercising official duties mean 
any and all acts or activities necessary for or concomi-
tant with the nature of  a specific public office under the 
relevant statutes, orders, regulations, or administrative 
customs and practices. Thus, the act of  the President in 
exercising official duties is a concept not only including 
an act based on pertinent statutes, orders, or regulations, 
but also encompassing any act performed by the Presi-
dent in his or her office as President with respect to the 
implementation of  state affairs,’ and includes any such 
acts, for example, visiting various organizations and in-
dustrial sites, participating in various events such as a 
dedication ceremony and an official dinner, appearing 
through the broadcasting media to explain government 
policies in order to seek the public understanding the-
reof  and to efficiently implement national policies, and 
agreeing to hold a press conference.
The Constitution sets forth the grounds for impea-
chment as a “violation of  the Constitution or statutes.” 
The ‘Constitution’ here includes the unwritten cons-
titution formed and established by the precedents of  
the Constitutional Court as well as the express consti-
tutional provisions; the ‘statutes’ include not only the 
statutes in their formal meaning, but also, for example, 
international treaties that are provided with the same 
force as statutes, and the international law that is gene-
rally approved.
5. Whether the respondent violated the Consti-
tution or statutes in exercising his official duties
Article 53(1) of  the Constitutional Court Act pro-
vides that the “Constitutional Court shall issue a deci-
sion removing the respondent from office should the 
grounds for the impeachment petition be valid.” There-
fore, in order to determine whether to issue a decision 
to remove the President from office, an examination 
should precede upon the existence of  the grounds for 
impeachment set forth in the Constitution, i.e., whether 
the ‘President violated the Constitution or statutes in 
the performance of  his official duties.’ In the immedia-
tely following paragraphs, we will examine each of  the 
grounds for impeachment stated in the impeachment 
resolution of  the National Assembly under the respec-
tive categories.
A. Act of  supporting a particular political party at 
a press conference (the statements at the press confe-
rence with six of  the Seoul-Incheon area news media 
organizations on February 18, 2004, and as an invited 
guest at the press conference with the Korean Network 
Reporters Club on February 24, 2004)
Pursuant to the acknowledged facts, the President 
stated, at a press conference on February 18, 2004 with 
six of  the Seoul-Incheon area news media organiza-
tions, that “... I simply cannot utter what will follow 
should the quorum to resist the constitution revision be 
destroyed”; and, at a press conference with the Korean 
Network Reporters Club, as an invited guest, which 
was broadcasted nationwide on February 24, 2004, in 
response to a question posed by a reporter concerning 
the upcoming general election that ‘how the respondent 
would run the political affairs if  the Uri Party would 
remain as a minority party unlike the anticipation of  
Chung Dong-young, the Chairman of  the Uri Party, 
projecting about 100 seats as a goal,’ the respondent 
stated that “I expect that the public will overwhelmingly 
support the Uri Party,” “I would like to do anything that 
is legal if  it may lead to the votes for the Uri Party,” and 
“when they elected Roh Moo-hyun as the President, the 
public will make it clear whether I will be backed to do it 
well for the four years to come or I cannot stand it and 
will be forced to step down.”
On the other hand, no arbitrary amendment to the 
impeachment resolution by the impeaching party in 
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order to add new facts not stated in the original reso-
lution is permitted in the impeachment adjudication 
proceeding. The statement of  the President made on 
March 11, 2004 that ‘connected the general election to 
the matter of  confidence of  the President’ is a fact not 
included in the original impeachment resolution of  the 
National Assembly and merely stated in the impeaching 
party’s brief  submitted to the Court as an additional 
ground for impeachment subsequent to the National 
Assembly’s resolution of  impeachment and, as such, 
the Court does not examine such additionally stated 
ground.
(1)Obligation of  a public official to maintain politi-
cal neutrality concerning elections
The political neutrality obligation concerning elec-
tions owed by public officials is a constitutional request 
drawn from the status of  public officials set forth in 
Section 1, Article 7, of  the Constitution; the principle 
of  free election set forth in Section 1, Article 41, and 
Section 1, Article 67, of  the Constitution; and the equal 
opportunity among the political parties guaranteed by 
Section 1, Article 116 of  the Constitution.
(A) Article 7(1) of  the Constitution provides that “all 
public officials shall be servants of  the entire people and 
shall be responsible to the people,” thereby setting forth 
that the public officials shall perform their official du-
ties for the welfare of  the public as a whole and should 
not serve the interest of  a particular political party or 
organization. The status and the responsibility of  the 
state institutions as the servant for the entire citizenry is, 
in the area of  election, realized in concrete terms as the 
‘obligation of  the state institutions to maintain neutra-
lity concerning elections.’ The state institutions should 
serve the entire population, therefore, should act neu-
trally in the competition among the political parties or 
political factions. Thus, Article 7(1) of  the Constitution 
mandates that no state institution should exercise in-
fluence in the free competition among political factions 
by identifying itself  with a particular political party or a 
candidate or taking sides with a particular political party 
or a candidate in electoral campaigns by use of  the in-
fluence and authority vested in the office.
(B) Articles 41(1) and 67(1) of  the Constitution pro-
vide for the principles applicable to the general election 
for members of  the National Assembly and the presi-
dential election, respectively. Although such provisions 
do not expressly mention the principle of  free election, 
in order for any election to properly represent the poli-
tical will of  the public, the voters should be able to form 
and decide their own opinions through a free and open 
process without undue extraneous influence. Therefore, 
the principle of  free election is part of  the fundamen-
tal principles of  election as a basic premise to provide 
legitimacy for the state institutions constituted by and 
through an election.
The principle of  free election not only means that 
the voters should be able to vote without forceful or un-
due influence from the state or the society, but also that 
the voters should be able to make their own judgment 
and decisions in a free and open process to form their 
own opinions. The principle of  free election, in turn, 
in the context of  state institutions, means the ‘obliga-
tion of  public officials to maintain neutrality,’ that is, 
the prohibition against the state institutions from su-
pporting or opposing any particular political party or 
candidate by identifying themselves with such particular 
political party or candidate.
(C) The obligation of  public officials to maintain 
neutrality concerning elections is mandated by the 
Constitution also from the standpoint of  equal op-
portunity among the political parties. The principle of  
equal opportunity among the political parties is a cons-
titutional principle derived from the interrelationship 
of  Article 8(1) of  the Constitution that guarantees the 
freedom to form a political party and the multi-party 
system and Article 11 of  the Constitution that sets for-
th the principle of  equality. Particularly, Article 116(1) 
of  the Constitution provides that “an equal opportuni-
ty should be guaranteed ... in the electoral campaign,” 
thereby specifying the ‘principle of  equal opportunity 
among the political parties’ concerning the political 
campaign. The principle of  equal opportunity among 
the political parties requires state institutions to act neu-
trally in the competition among political parties at the 
elections, thus prohibiting the state institutions from ei-
ther favoring or prejudicing any particular political party 
or candidate in the electoral campaign.
(2)Whether the respondent violated Article 9 of 
the Public Officials Election Act (neutrality obli-
gation of a public official)
Article 9 of  the Public Officials Election Act pro-
vides that “no public official or no one obligated to 
maintain political neutrality should act in a way unduly 
influencing the election or otherwise affecting the ou-
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tcome of  the election,” and thereby provides for the 
‘obligation of  public officials to maintain neutrality 
concerning elections.’
(A) Whether the President is a ‘public official’ 
within the meaning of Article 9 of the Public Of-
ficials Election Act
The issue here is whether the officials at certain po-
litical offices such as the President fall within the defini-
tion of  a ‘public official or anyone obligated to maintain 
political neutrality’ of  Article 9 of  the Public Officials 
Election Act.
1) Article 9 of  the Public Officials Election Act is a 
statutory provision that specifies and realizes the cons-
titutionally requested ‘obligation of  public officials to 
maintain neutrality concerning elections,’ derived from 
Article 7(1) (status of  a public official as a servant for 
the public as a whole), Article 41, Article 67 (princi-
ple of  free election) and Article 116 (principle of  equal 
opportunity among the political parties) of  the Consti-
tution. Therefore, the ‘public official’ within the mea-
ning of  Article 9 of  the Public Officials Election Act 
means any and all public officials who should be obli-
gated to maintain neutrality concerning elections, that 
is, more particularly, any or all public officials who are 
in a position to threaten the ‘principle of  free election’ 
and ‘equal opportunity among the political parties at the 
election.’ Considering that practically all public officials 
are in a position to exercise undue influence upon the 
election in the course of  exercising through exercise of  
their official duties, public officials here include, in prin-
ciple, all public officials of  the national and local go-
vernments, that is, all career public officials as narrowly 
defined, and, further include public officials at offices 
of  political nature who serve the state through active 
political activities (for example, the President, the Prime 
Minister, the ministers of  the administration, and the 
chief  executive officer at various levels of  local gover-
nment such as the governor, the mayor, and the county 
magistrate).
The possibility of  affecting the public’s open opi-
nion formulation process and distorting the political 
parties’ competitive relationship through the function 
and influence of  the official duties is particularly grea-
ter for the executive institutions at the national or local 
governments. Therefore, political neutrality concerning 
elections is even more greatly requested than other pu-
blic officials for the President and the chief  executive 
officers at the local governments.
2) Obligating public officials to maintain neutrality 
concerning elections in Article 9 of  the Public Officials 
Election Act is a mere specification of  the constitutional 
request of  the principle of  free election, the principle 
of  equal opportunity among the political parties, and 
the ‘obligation of  public officials to maintain neutrality 
concerning elections’ derived from Article 7(1) of  the 
Constitution, made applicable to public officials in the 
area of  election law. Thus, such provision is constitutio-
nal as long as it is interpreted to exclude the members 
of  the National Assembly and the members of  the local 
legislatures from whom political neutrality concerning 
elections cannot be requested.
The members of  the National Assembly and the 
members of  the local legislatures are not ‘public offi-
cials’ within the meaning of  Article 9 of  the Public 
Officials Election Act, due to their status as political 
party representatives and as active figures at the electo-
ral campaign. The state institutions bear the obligation 
to maintain neutrality concerning elections, in order to 
provide a ‘forum for free competition’ where the poli-
tical parties can compete fairly at the election. In such 
‘free competition among the political parties’ guaran-
teed by the state’s neutrality obligation, the members of  
the National Assembly play an active role at the electo-
ral campaigns as the representatives of  their respective 
political parties. That is, whereas the state institutions 
administrate the election and should not affect the elec-
tion as the institutions that are mandated to guarantee a 
fair election, the political parties, on the other hand, are 
premised on the mission to affect the election.
3) Also, a systematic analysis of  the meaning of  ‘pu-
blic officials’ in Article 9 of  the Public Officials Elec-
tion Act in its interrelationship with other provisions of  
the Public Officials Election Act or with other statutes 
mandates an interpretation that the concept of  ‘public 
officials’ in the Public Officials Election Act includes all 
public officials at political offices with the exception of  
the members of  the National Assembly and of  the local 
legislatures. For example, the Public Officials Election 
Act uses ‘public officials’ as a general term to include 
public officials at political offices in its Article 60(1)(ⅳ) 
that prohibits, in principle, the political campaign of  pu-
blic officials and also in Article 86(1) that prohibits the 
acts of  public officials influencing the election. Further-
more, in such other statutes as the State Public Officials 
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Act (in Article 2 and other provisions) and the Political 
Party Act (in Article 6 and other provisions), the term 
‘public official’ is used inclusive of  public officials at 
political offices.
4) Therefore, political neutrality concerning elec-
tions is a basic obligation of  all public officials of  the 
executive branch and the judiciary. Furthermore, since 
the President bears the obligation to oversee and mana-
ge a fair electoral process as the head of  the executive 
branch, the President is, as a matter of  course, a ‘public 
official’ within the meaning of  Article 9 of  the Public 
Officials Election Act.
(B) The President as a ‘constitutional institution 
of a political nature’ and the ‘obligation to main-
tain neutrality concerning elections’
The fact that the President is a ‘constitutional institu-
tion of  a political nature’ is a distinct matter and should 
thus be distinguished from the question of  whether the 
President bears the ‘obligation to maintain political neu-
trality concerning elections.’
The President, in ordinary circumstances, is elected 
through the electoral campaign endorsed and suppor-
ted by a political party, as a party member. Therefore, 
the President generally maintains party membership 
after being elected as the President and also retains an 
affiliation with such particular political party. Current 
law also provides that the President may maintain party 
membership (Article 6(1) of  the Political Party Act) and 
thus permits party activities, unlike in the case of  other 
career public officials who are not allowed to be a mem-
ber of  a political party.
However, the President is not an institution that im-
plements the policies of  the ruling party, but instead, the 
President is the constitutional institution that is obliga-
ted to serve and realize the public interest as the head of  
the executive branch. The President is not the President 
merely for part of  the population or a certain particular 
political faction that supported him or her at the past 
election, but he or she is the President of  the entire 
community organized as the state and is the President 
for the entire constituents. The President is obligated 
to unify the social community by serving the entire po-
pulation beyond that segment of  the population sup-
porting him or her. The status of  the President as the 
servant of  the entire public is specified, in the context 
of  election, as the status of  ultimately overseeing a fair 
election, and the Public Officials Election Act therefore 
prohibits a political campaign by the President (Article 
60(1)(iv) of  the Public Officials Election Act).
Therefore, neither the fact that the President is a pu-
blic official of  a political nature who is elected through 
nomination and support by a political party nor the fact 
that certain political and party activities of  the President 
are permitted can serve as a valid ground for denying 
the obligation owed by the President to maintain politi-
cal neutrality concerning elections.
(C) The President’s ‘obligation of  political neutrality’ 
concerning elections and ‘freedom to express political 
opinions’ Every person in public office is obligated to 
maintain political neutrality concerning elections; on 
the other hand, at the same time such person is a citi-
zen of  the state and is subject of  basic rights who may 
assert his or her own basic rights against the state. Li-
kewise, in the case of  the presidency, the status of  the 
President as a private citizen who may perform party 
activities for the party of  his of  her membership and 
the status of  the President as a constitutional institution 
bearing the obligation to serve the entire population 
and the public welfare should be distinguished as two 
distinct concepts.
The mandate that the President should maintain po-
litical neutrality concerning elections does not require 
no political activities or indifference to party politics on 
the part of  the President. Unlike other public officials 
who are prevented from any party activities, the Presi-
dent, as a member or an officer of  a political party, may 
not only be involved with the internal decision making 
process of  the party and perform ordinary party activi-
ties, but also may participate in the party convention to 
express his or her political opinions and express sup-
port for the party of  his or her membership. However, 
at the same time, even when the President exercises his 
or her freedom of  expression as a political figure, the 
President should restrain and limit himself  or herself  in 
light of  the significance of  the office of  the presidency 
and the potential reflections of  his or her remarks and 
acts, and should not make an impression towards the 
public that the President may no more fairly exercise 
presidential duties due to his or her political activities 
outside the presidential duties. Furthermore, since the 
ultimate noticeability of  the President obscures the 
President’s ‘exercise of  basic rights as a private citizen’ 
and ‘activity within the boundary of  the presidential du-
ties,’ the President, even in the case where the President 
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is exercising the freedom of  speech as a private citizen 
and performing party activities, should do so in a way 
appropriate to a harmonious implementation of  the 
presidency and the maintenance of  the functions the-
reof, that is, in accordance with the request of  Article 
7(1) of  the Constitution that the President should serve 
the entire public.
Therefore, the President should, in principle, res-
train himself  or herself  from expressing his or her per-
sonal opinions towards party politics when exercising 
duties as the head of  the state or the chief  executive 
officer. Furthermore, when the President makes state-
ments concerning elections as the state institution of  
president and not as a party member or as a mere poli-
tical figure, the President is bound by the obligation to 
maintain political neutrality concerning elections.
(D) Violation of Article 9 of the Public Officials 
Election Act
Article 9 of  the Public Officials Election Act provi-
des that “no public official shall exercise undue influen-
ce upon the election or otherwise affect the outcome of  
the election,” thereby setting forth acts to be prohibited 
in order to realize the obligation of  public officials to 
maintain neutrality concerning elections. Specifically, 
Article 9 of  the Public Official Act provides the ‘act 
affecting the outcome of  the election’ as the violation 
of  the neutrality obligation, and mentions the ‘exercise 
of  undue influence upon the election’ as a typical exam-
ple therefor.
Therefore, the question of  whether the President 
violated the neutrality obligation concerning elections 
depends upon whether the President ‘exercised undue 
influence upon the election,’ and should a public ser-
vant affect the election by taking advantage of  the poli-
tical weight and influence vested in the official duties in 
a way not appropriate for the mission to serve and be 
held responsible for the entire public or residents, such 
is beyond the boundaries of  political activities permit-
ted for a public official at the election, thus constituting 
an act of  exercising undue influence upon the election.
Thus, if  a public official is acting in the status of  
a public servant and taking advantage of  the influence 
vested in the public duties, undue influence upon the 
election is found to be exercised, thus constituting a 
violation of  the neutrality obligation concerning elec-
tions.
(E) Whether the statements of the President vio-
lated the neutrality obligation owed by public 
officials
Whether the statements of  the President violated 
Article 9 of  the Public Officials Election Act depends 
upon the judgment as to ‘whether the President affec-
ted the election through his statements by taking advan-
tage of  the political weight and influence of  the public 
office of  presidency in a way that was not appropriate 
for his status to serve the entire national public’ in light 
of  the specific contents of  the statements, their timing 
and frequency, and the specific circumstance thereof.
1) The statements of  the President at issue herein 
should be deemed to have been made in the president’s 
status as a public servant and in implementing the offi-
cial duties of  the President or in relation thereto. The 
President held the above press conferences not as a pri-
vate citizen or a mere political figure, but as the Presi-
dent, and the President, in such course, made the state-
ments supporting a particular political party by taking 
advantage of  the political weight and influence vested 
in his status as the President. Therefore, the statements 
made by the President at the above press conferences 
constitute an act ‘in the performance of  his official du-
ties’ within the meaning of  Article 65(1) of  the Cons-
titution.
2) In the case of  the general election to constitute 
the National Assembly, general parliamentary activities 
of  the individual assemblypersons, the political parties, 
and the negotiating parties during the four-year term 
function as an important and meaningful indicator for 
the voters to form their judgment at the next election. 
Especially during the period designated for the electoral 
campaign under the Public Officials Election Act, the 
political parties, the negotiating parties and the indivi-
dual candidates are involved in a feverous competition 
in order to obtain the trust and a vote from the voters 
in every possible legitimate way, by presenting their po-
licies and political designs and criticizing the policies of  
the opposing parties or candidates in competition.
Here, if  the President makes a statement unilaterally 
supporting a particular political party and influences 
the process by which the public forms its opinions, the 
President thereby intervenes and distorts the process 
of  the independent formation of  the public’s opinions 
based on a just evaluation of  the political parties and 
the candidates. This, at the same time, diminishes by 
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half  the meaning of  the political activities continuou-
sly done by the political parties and the candidates in 
the past several years in order to obtain the trust of  
the public, and thereby gravely depreciates the principle 
of  parliamentary democracy. An electoral campaign in 
a democratic country is a free and open competition 
for multiple parties and candidates, with a goal to ob-
tain political power, to seek a vote, by emphasizing their 
political activities and achievements during the past and 
by convincing the voters of  the legitimacy of  the policy 
they pursue. Such free competition relationship among 
the political parties to obtain the votes through the vo-
ters’ judgment upon the policies and political activities 
is significantly perverted by one-sided intervention of  
the President supporting a particular party.
The relevant part of  the President’s statements at 
issue repeatedly and actively expressed his support for a 
particular political party in the course of  performing his 
official duties and further directly appealed to the public 
for the support of  that particular political party. The-
refore, the President’s taking advantage of  his political 
weight and influence vested in his public office throu-
gh the above statements favoring a particular political 
party, by way of  identifying himself  with such political 
party, was an exercise of  undue influence in a way not 
appropriate for his responsibility as a servant for the 
entire public by the use of  his status as a state institu-
tion. The President thereby violated his obligation to 
maintain neutrality concerning elections.
3) The judgment upon whether there was undue in-
fluence on the election may also vary depending upon 
the timing certain statements supporting a particular 
party were made. Should a statement as such be made at 
a time where there is no temporally intimate relation to 
an election, there is only a remote or limited possibility 
for such statements to affect the outcome of  the elec-
tion. However, as the election approaches, the possibi-
lity for the President’s statement supporting a particular 
political party to affect the outcome of  the election in-
creases, therefore the President bears during such time 
period, as a state institution, an obligation to restrain, 
as much as possible, any and all acts that may unfairly 
influence the election.
Although it is not possible to clearly discern when 
an one-sided act of  the state institution begins to par-
ticularly affect the election, the statements by the Pre-
sident at issue herein were made on February 18, 2004 
and February 24, 2004, with approximately two months 
remaining before the general election for the National 
Assembly on April 15, 2004. Thus, at that time, there 
existed a temporal intimacy between the statements and 
the election as the preparation for the electoral cam-
paign had practically begun and the probability of  the 
act of  a state institution to influence the election was 
relatively high, and there was an increased demand for 
the political neutrality of  state institutions at least du-
ring that period of  time.
4) The President, then, violated the obligation to 
maintain neutrality concerning elections, by making the 
statements at the press conferences toward the entire 
public in support of  a particular political party by taking 
advantage of  the political weight and influence of  the 
presidency, when the political neutrality of  public offi-
cial was highly demanded more than ever due to the 
temporal proximity to the election, while the President 
is ultimately responsible to oversee a fair administration 
of  election, since such statements constituted acts per-
formed using the respondent’s status as the President 
unduly influencing the election and thereby affecting 
the outcome of  the election.
(3)Whether the respondent violated Article 60 
of the Public Officials Election Act(prohibition of 
electoral campaign by public official)
(A) Definition of electoral campaign
Article 58(1) of  the Public Officials Election Act 
defines the term ‘electoral campaign’ as an ‘activity for 
winning an election or for having another person be or 
not be elected.’ The Public Officials Election Act, in 
a proviso in the same provision, lists certain ‘acts not 
deemed to constitute electoral campaign,’ which are: 
mere expression of  opinion toward election, prepara-
tory activity to register as a candidate and for electoral 
campaign, mere expression of  opinion in agreement or 
disagreement toward the parties’ recommendation of  
the candidates, and ordinary party activities.
Pursuant to the precedents of  the Constitutional 
Court, the ‘electoral campaign’ under Article 58(1) of  
the Public Officials Election Act is any and all active 
and premeditated deeds for a specific candidate’s win-
ning the election and obtaining the votes therefore, or 
any and all active and premeditated deeds to have a 
specific candidate lose the election, among which the-
re is an objective intent to win or to have win or lose 
the election (6-2 KCCR 15, 33, 93Hun-Ka4, July 29, 
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1994; 13-2 KCCR 263, 274; 2000Hun-Ma121, August 
30, 2001).
The important standard in determining whether a 
specific act falls within the definition of  electoral cam-
paign is the existence of  the required ‘intent,’ whereas 
other nature of  ‘activeness’ or ‘premeditatedness’ is a 
secondary element that contributes to an objective fin-
ding and analyzing of  the required ‘intent’ of  the electo-
ral campaign. Since the ‘purposeful intent’ of  the actor 
is a highly subjective element and it is difficult to discern 
such element, such element may be found to a certain 
extent of  objectivity through other ‘subjective elements 
that can be objectified’ in relative terms of  the ‘active-
ness’ of  the deed or the ‘premeditatedness’ thereof.
(B)Whether the statements of the President con-
stituted electoral campaign
1) Article 58(1) of  the Public Officials Election Act 
makes it a prerequisite for the electoral campaign ‘whe-
ther or not a candidate can be specified,’ by adopting 
the standard of  ‘being elected’ in defining the concept 
of  ‘electoral campaign.’ Therefore, the concept of  elec-
toral campaign is premised upon that it should be an 
activity to have win or lose a ‘specific’ or at least ‘dis-
cernible’ candidate. Although a statement supporting a 
specific political party may satisfy the definition of  elec-
toral campaign since an activity intended to obtain votes 
for a specific political party inevitably means an activity 
intended to have the candidate nominated by that party 
in a certain district, even in such circumstances, a candi-
date intended to have win through such statement must 
be discernible.
When the statements at issue in this case were made 
on February 18, 2004 and February 24, 2004, the par-
ty-endorsed candidates had not yet been determined. 
Therefore, the statement supporting a particular politi-
cal party when the party-endorsed candidates were not 
specified did not constitute an electoral campaign.
2) Also, whereas an activity requires a ‘purposeful 
intent’ to have a certain candidate win or lose an elec-
tion in order for such activity to constitute an electoral 
campaign, there was no such purposeful intent in the 
statements at issue in the instant case.
a) In order for an election to properly represent the 
political will of  the public, the voters should be able 
to make their decisions in a free and open process to 
form their own opinions. At the same time, the voters 
may make truly free decisions as voters only when they 
are aware of  which candidates advocate and intend to 
implement the policies they support and are correctly 
informed of  the candidates and the policy directions 
among which they can choose. Therefore, in terms of  
the public’s right to know, it is required, as the election 
approaches, to provide certain information that may 
form the basis of  the voters’ decision or the informa-
tion as to the parties and the candidates, through va-
rious means such as press conferences.
Therefore, strictly including all of  the statements at a 
press conference in the definition of  the electoral cam-
paign would excessively limit the freedom of  expres-
sion of  a political figure. Especially, when the current 
Public Officials Election Act permits electoral cam-
paigns only during a short period designated for such, 
and even additionally limits the electoral campaigns in 
various terms such as their subjects and means, defining 
the term ‘electoral campaign’ too loosely might mean 
an even further shrinking of  the scope of  freedom of  
political activities given to the public.
Then, a statement at a press conference does not, 
in itself, constitute an electoral campaign and likewise 
is not, in itself, excluded from the activities constituting 
an electoral campaign. Rather, more than anything else, 
whether a ‘purposeful intent of  a considerable degree 
to perform an electoral campaign by taking advanta-
ge of  such opportunities as press conferences can be 
found’ should be determined on a case-by-case basis, 
considering the totality of  the specific aspects of  the 
activity, such as the timing of  the statement, its content, 
venue, and context. Here, the activeness and the preme-
ditatedness of  the statement operates as an important 
standard in perceiving ‘purposeful intent.’
b) In the instant case, although the statements at 
issue were made in a close temporal proximity to the 
approaching general election of  April 15, 2004, such 
statements, in terms of  the content and the specific cir-
cumstance of  the statements, were made in the form of  
a response to the question posed by the reporters at the 
press conferences, thus in a passive and unintentional 
way. Considering this, no element of  activeness or pre-
meditatedness towards an electoral campaign is found 
in the statements of  the President. Therefore, such sta-
tements lacked any purposeful intent of  a considerable 
degree sufficient to constitute an electoral campaign.
3) Therefore, although the statements of  the respon-
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dent pleaded to the public for their support of  the Uri 
Party, such statements cannot be deemed as an act of  an 
active and intentional electoral campaign to have spe-
cific or discernible candidates win or lose the election. 
Thus, the respondent’s act in relevant part did not violate 
Article 60(1) of  the Public Officials Election Act or its 
punishment provision of  Article 255(1) of  the Act.
(4)Whether the respondent violated Articles 
85(1) or 86(1) of the Public Officials Election Act
Article 85(1) of  the Public Officials Election Act 
prohibits public officials from conducting electoral 
campaigns using their status as such, and deems electo-
ral campaigns by public officials toward other officers 
of  the same public office or the employees and officers 
of  a particular institution or business as an electoral 
campaign by way of  his or her status as a public official.
However, as discussed above, the statements of  the 
respondent at issue herein do not constitute electoral 
campaign activities, and therefore such statements did 
not violate Article 85(1) of  the Public Officials Election 
Act without further reviewing the same.
Article 86(1) of  the Public Officials Election Act 
prohibits various election-related activities of  a public 
official. First, Subdivision (i) prohibits an act publici-
zing the achievements of  a specific party or a candi-
date towards other officers of  the same public office 
or the constituents within the election district. The 
respondent’s statements do not contain any that publi-
cized the achievements of  the Uri Party, thus Subdivi-
sion (i) does not apply herein. Next, Subdivisions (ii) 
through (vii) are clearly inapplicable to the respondent’s 
statements in terms of  the constituting elements in the-
mselves. Therefore, there was no violation of  Article 
86(1) of  the Public Officials Election Act.
B. Other remarks concerning the general elec-
tion
(1)Remark at the Remember 1219 event on De-
cember 19, 2003
Pursuant to the acknowledged facts, the President 
on December 19, 2003, participated in the event enti-
tled “Remember 1219” hosted by the reform netizen 
front such as the Roh-Sa-Mo, and stated that “your re-
volution is yet to be concluded,” “The citizen revolu-
tion is still going on at this very moment,” and that “my 
dear respected members of  Roh-Sa-Mo, and citizens, 
let’s step forward once again.”
The above statements were made at an event to cele-
brate the one-year anniversary of  President Roh’s elec-
tion as the President, while invited to the event. It was 
hosted by certain associations that supported President 
Roh at the election such as Roh-Sa-Mo. Reviewed in 
the whole context, the above statements were to plead 
for participation in election reform (‘fair election whe-
re money is not required’) or political reform, or sim-
ply to ‘generally ask for the support of  the President 
himself,’ and, as such, can hardly be deemed as state-
ments seeking the support for a particular political party 
concerning the election or inciting illegal an electoral 
campaign by the citizen organizations. Therefore, the 
above statements of  the President were not beyond the 
boundaries of  permissible expression of  opinions to-
ward politics and did not constitute a violation of  the 
political neutrality obligation concerning elections or an 
electoral campaign activity prior to the permitted time 
period. Also, such statements did not constitute a viola-
tion for any other statutes.
However, such an one-sided act of  the President to-
ward a specific citizen organization might well cause a 
division between the groups of  citizens supporting the 
President and the groups of  citizens not supporting the 
President and, thereby, does not conform to the obliga-
tion of  the President to unify the national community 
as the President of  the entire public, which might lead 
to the public’s distrust against the administration as a 
whole.
(2)Remark at the luncheon with former presi-
dential aides on December 24, 2003 at Cheong 
Wa Dae
Pursuant to the acknowledged facts, the President 
on December 24, 2003, at a luncheon at Cheong Wa 
Dae with nine others including his former presidential 
aides who had resigned in order to run for the general 
election, stated that “the next year’s general election will 
have a polarized structure between the Grand National 
Party and the President with the Uri Party on the other 
side,” and that “a vote for the New Millennium Demo-
cratic Party at next year’s election will be conceived as 
support for the Grand National Party.”
In this case of  a luncheon at Cheong Wa Dae hos-
ted by the President and the first lady for the former 
Cheong Wa Dae aides and the administrative officers, 
the nature of  the meeting was private rather than one 
hosted by the President in his official status as the Presi-
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dent. The content of  the statements can hardly be dee-
med as statements intended by the President to unduly 
influence the election by taking advantage of  the politi-
cal influence of  his official status. The above statements 
of  the President, considering altogether the other party 
of  the speech, the context thereof  and the motive the-
refor, were acts justified by the freedom of  expression 
under the Constitution as an exercise of  the freedom 
to express opinion towards politics, and did not exceed 
the limits on the political activities permitted for public 
officials of  political offices.
(3) Remark at the beginning-of-the-year press 
conference on January 14, 2004
Pursuant to the acknowledged facts, the President at 
the beginningof-the-year press conference on January 
14, 2004, stated that “there was a split because there 
were those who supported reform and those who did 
not support reform fearing it, and I would like to go 
together with the Uri Party as those who supported me 
at the presidential election are running the Uri Party.”
The above statement was made as a response to a 
reporter’s question asking ‘when the President would 
join the Uri Party,’ and, as such, was a mere expression 
by the President, who is permitted to have party mem-
bership, stating the party that he supported and his po-
sition as to whether he would join such party and, if  
so, when. Therefore, since the President did not intend 
through the above statements to support a particular 
political party concerning the election or thereby to in-
fluence the election, the above statement did not cons-
titute a violation of  the neutrality obligation concerning 
elections owed by public officials or an electoral cam-
paign activity.
(4) Remark at the meeting with the Gangwon-Do 
region journalists on February 5, 2004
Pursuant to the acknowledged facts, the President 
at the meeting with the journalists in the Gangwon-Do 
region on February 5, 2004, stated that “the Citizen 
Participation 0415 (Kook-Cham 0415) members’ parti-
cipation in politics should be permitted and encouraged 
both legally and politically.”
The above statement was made as a response to the 
question asking the “President’s opinion as to the deba-
te concerning the Citizen Participation 0415’s activities 
declaring to have certain candidates win the election as 
illegal intervention into the election.” As such, the state-
ment is understood to mean that, ‘in order to be an ad-
vanced electoral culture, we should encourage voluntary 
participation and activities of  the citizenry, and in order 
to achieve this goal the citizen participation in politics 
should be legally permitted as widely as possible, and at 
the least a generous legal interpretation is required as 
long as it is not against the law.’ Therefore, the above 
statement was a mere expression of  the respondent’s 
personal opinion upon the aspect of  the public partici-
pation in politics, and thereby did not constitute a viola-
tion of  the neutrality obligation concerning elections or 
the prohibition of  electoral campaign activities.
(5)The “Uri Party Strategy for the 17th General 
Election” reported in Joong-Ang Ilbo dated Fe-
bruary 27, 2004
The Joong-Ang Ilbo reported with respect to a clas-
sified document entitled “Uri Party Strategy for the 
17th General Election” on February 27, 2004, which 
posed suspicion as to the organizational intervention of  
Cheong Wa Dae into the election. However, even under 
the entire evidence submitted and accepted during the 
proceedings in this case, there is no finding that the res-
pondent directed or was involved in the election strate-
gy of  the Uri Party. Therefore, there is no valid ground 
for impeachment in this regard.
(6)Act interfering with free election by threate-
ning the public
With respect to the ground for impeachment un-
der this count, there is no specific facts alleged in this 
regard, instead, the impeachment resolution merely al-
leges that the respondent interfered with the public’s 
free election by ‘inducing support for a particular po-
litical party by threatening the public and by repeatedly 
making statements affecting the public’s will concerning 
the general election.’ There is no factual basis to find 
that the respondent’s statements concerning the elec-
tion had a pervasive effect in the general community 
of  public officials thereby actually affecting negatively 
upon the neutrality of  public officials at the election, 
that the executive organization of  which the respon-
dent is the chief  officer intervened in the election for 
a particular political party, or that the function of  the 
election management commission was impeded upon. 
Nor is it plausible to deem that the respondent thereby 
interfered with or distorted the unbridled formation of  
the public’s will concerning the election or interfered 
with the free exercise of  voting rights.
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Therefore, the respondent’s statements neither inter-
fered with free election nor did such statements violate 
Article 237(1)(iii) of  the Public Officials Election Act 
providing for the crime of  interfering with the election.
C. Acts at issue with respect to the obligation to 
abide by and protect the Constitution
(Articles 66(2) and 69 of the Constitution)
(1)The President’s obligation to abide by and 
protect the Constitution
Article 66 of  the Constitution, in Section 2, ‘obliga-
tes’ the President ‘to protect the independence of  the 
state, the preservation of  the territorial integrity, the 
continuity of  the state, and the nation’s Constitution,’ 
and in Section 3 ‘obligates’ the President ‘to faithfully 
endeavor for the peaceful reunification of  the nation.’ 
Article 69 of  the Constitution obligates the President to 
take an oath of  office, the content of  which correspon-
ds to such obligations. Article 69 of  the Constitution 
not only sets forth the obligation of  the President to 
take an oath of  office, but also functions as a substan-
tive provision specifying and emphasizing the constitu-
tional obligations of  the President under Article 66(2) 
and Article 66(3) of  the Constitution.
The ‘obligation to abide by and protect the Consti-
tution’ of  the President set forth in Articles 66(2) and 
69 of  the Constitution is the constitutional manifesta-
tion that specifies the constitutional principle of  gover-
nment by the rule of  law in relation to the President’s 
performance of  official duties. Expressed only in sum-
mary, the fundamental element of  the principle of  the 
rule of  law, which is a basic constitutional principle, is 
that any and all operation of  the state shall be by the 
‘Constitution’ and the ‘statutes’ enacted by the legislatu-
re consisting of  the representatives of  the people and 
that any and all exercise of  the state authority shall be 
the object of  the judicial control in the form of  ad-
ministrative adjudication for the executive function and 
constitutional adjudication for the legislative function. 
Accordingly, the legislature is bound by the constitu-
tion, and the executive and the judicial branches of  the 
government implementing and applying the law, respec-
tively, are bound by the Constitution and the statutes. 
Therefore, the President, as the chief  of  the executive 
branch, is constitutionally mandated to respect and abi-
de by the constitution and the statutes.
While the ‘obligation to abide by and protect the 
Constitution’ is a norm derived from the principle of  
government by the rule of  law, the Constitution repea-
tedly emphasizes such obligation of  the President in 
Articles 66(2) and 69, considering the significance of  
the status of  the President as the head of  the state and 
the chief  of  the executive branch. Under the spirit of  
the Constitution as such, the President is the ‘symbolic 
existence personifying the rule of  law and the obser-
vance of  law’ toward the entire public. Accordingly, the 
President should not only make every possible effort 
to protect and realize the Constitution, but also abide 
by the law and perform no act in violation of  any of  
the valid law. Furthermore, the President should do all 
acts in order to implement the objective will of  the le-
gislator. The obligation of  the executive branch of  the 
government to respect and implement the law is equally 
applicable to the statutes that the executive branch dee-
ms unconstitutional. Since the Constitutional Court alo-
ne is vested with the authority under the Constitution 
to remove a statute that is unconstitutional, even if  the 
executive branch suspects a particular statute to be un-
constitutional, the executive branch should make every 
possible effort to respect and implement the law unless 
and until the Constitutional Court holds such statute 
unconstitutional.
(2) Acts of the President to the National Election 
Commission’s decision that the President viola-
ted the election law
(A) Pursuant to the acknowledged facts, President 
Roh Moo-hyun stated through Lee Byung-wan, the Se-
nior Secretary to the President for Public Information, 
on March 4, 2004, as the position of  Cheong Wa Dae 
concerning the National Election Commission’s deci-
sion warning him of  his undue intervention into the 
election that “I would like to make it clear that the deci-
sion of  the National Election Commission at this time 
is not convincing,” “Now we should change both the 
institution and the custom under the standard of  advan-
ced democracy,” “The election-related law of  the past 
when the president mobilized ... the state institutions 
should now be reformed rationally,” and “The interpre-
tation of  the election law and the decision concerning 
the election law should also be adjusted in conformity 
with such different culture surrounding the state autho-
rity and new trend of  the time.” Although the above 
stated position of  Cheong Wa Dae on March 4, 2004 
to the National Election Commission’s decision was, 
internally, a position reached at a meeting of  senior pre-
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sidential secretaries, all of  the positions of  Cheong Wa 
Dae that are publicly announced revert, in principle, to 
the President. Particularly in this case, the acknowled-
ged facts indicate that the Office of  the President re-
ported the outcome of  the meeting to the President and 
held the briefing at issue upon the President’s approval. 
Therefore, the above statements made by the Senior Se-
cretary to the President for Public Information should 
be deemed as acts of  the President himself. The pur-
port of  the above statements announced by the Senior 
Secretary to the President for Public Information is that 
the President expressed unsatisfaction toward the Na-
tional Election Commission’s decision and denigrated 
the current election law as the ‘vestige of  the era of  the 
government-power-interfered elections.’
(B) The President’s acts denigrating the current law 
as the ‘vestige of  the era of  the government-power-
-interfered elections’ and publicly questioning the cons-
titutionality and the legitimacy of  the statute from his 
status as the President do not conform to the obligation 
to abide by and protect the Constitution and statutes. 
Should the President suspect the constitutionality of  a 
bill passed by the National Assembly or suspect that 
such a bill can be improved, the President should ask 
for reconsideration by returning such bill to the Natio-
nal Assembly (Article 53(2) of  the Constitution), and 
should the President doubt the constitutionality of  a 
current statute, the President should perform his or 
her obligation to implement the Constitution by, for 
example, having the administration review the consti-
tutionality of  such statute and thereby introduce a bill 
to revise such statute or revising the statute in a cons-
titutional manner through the support of  the National 
Assembly (Article 52 of  the Constitution). Even if  the 
President suspects the constitutionality of  a statute, 
questioning the constitutionality of  such statute itself  
in front of  the national public constitutes a violation of  
the President’s obligation to protect the Constitution. 
The President, of  course, may express his or her own 
position and belief  regarding the direction for revising 
the current statutes as a political figure. However, it is 
of  great importance that in which circumstances and in 
which relations such discussions on possible statutory 
revisions take place. The President’s statements denigra-
ting the current election statutes by comparing them to 
the equivalent foreign legislations as a response to and 
in the context of  the National Election Commission’s 
warning for the violation of  such election statutes can-
not be deemed as an attitude respecting the law.
The statements as such made by the President, who 
should serve as a good example for all public officials, 
might have significantly negative influence on the rea-
lization of  a government by the rule of  law, by grave-
ly affecting the other public officials obligated to res-
pect and abide by the law and, further, by lowering the 
public’s awareness to abide by the law. Namely, it cannot 
be denied that an obscure attitude or a reserved position 
of  the President toward government by the rule of  law 
gravely affects the nation as a whole and the constitu-
tional order. When the President himself  or herself  fails 
to respect and abide by the law, no citizen, let alone no 
other public officials, can be demanded to abide by the 
law.
(C) To conclude, the act of the President questio-
ning the legitimacy and the normative power 
of the current statute in front of the public is 
against the principle of government by the rule 
of law and is in violation of the obligation to pro-
tect the Constitution.
(3)Act of suggesting a confidence vote in the 
form of a national referendum on October 13, 
2003
Since the National Assembly’s impeachment resolu-
tion specifically mentions the President’s ‘unconstitutio-
nal suggestion to have a confidence referendum’ with 
respect to its third stated ground for impeachment of  
‘unfaithful performance of  official duties and reckless 
administration of  state affairs’ and the National Assem-
bly further specified on this issue in its brief  submitted 
subsequent to the initiation of  the impeachment adjudi-
cation, we examine this issue as a subject matter of  this 
impeachment adjudication.
(A) The President, during ‘his speech’ at the National 
Assembly on October 13, 2003 ‘concerning the budget 
for fiscal year of  2004,’ stated that “I announced last 
week that I would submit myself  for public confidence. 
... Although it is not a matter that I can determine, I 
think a national referendum is a correct way to do this. 
Although there are disputes as to legal issues, I think it 
is feasible even under the current law by interpreting 
the ‘matters concerning national security’ more broadly, 
should there be a political agreement,” thereby sugges-
ting a confidence vote to be instituted in December of  
2003. Debates concerning the constitutional permissi-
bility of  a confidence vote were thereby caused. Finally, 
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such debates upon the constitutionality of  a confidence 
referendum reached the Constitutional Court through a 
constitutional petition, but the Constitutional Court, in 
its majority opinion of  five Justices in 2003Hun-Ma694 
(issued on November 27, 2003), dismissed such consti-
tutional petition on the ground that the ‘act of  the Pre-
sident that is the subject matter of  the case was not an 
act accompanying legal effect but an expression of  a 
mere political plan, therefore did not constitute an exer-
cise of  governmental power.’
(B) Article 72 of  the Constitution vests in the Pre-
sident the authority to institute national referendum by 
providing that the “President may submit important 
policies relating to diplomacy, national defense, unifica-
tion and other matters relating to the national destiny to 
a national referendum if  he or she deems it necessary. 
Article 72 of  the Constitution connotes a danger that 
the President might use national referendum as a po-
litical weapon and politically abuse such device by em-
ploying it to further legitimize his or her policy and to 
strengthen his or her political position beyond as a mere 
means to confirm the will of  the public toward a speci-
fic policy, as the President monopolizes the discretiona-
ry authority to institute national referendum including 
the authority to decide whether to institute a national 
referendum, its timing, and the specific agendas to be 
voted on and the questions to be asked at the referen-
dum, under Article 72 of  the Constitution. Thus, Arti-
cle 72 of  the Constitution vesting within the President 
the authority to institute a national referendum should 
be strictly and narrowly interpreted in order to prevent 
the political abuse of  national referendum by the Pre-
sident.
(C) From this standpoint, the ‘important policy mat-
ters’ that can be subjected to a national referendum un-
der Article 72 of  the Constitution do not include the 
‘trust of  the public’ in the President.
An election is for the ‘decision on persons,’ that is, 
an election is to determine the representatives of  the 
public as a premise to make representative democra-
cy possible. By contrast, the national referendum is a 
means to realize direct democracy, and its object or 
subject matter is the ‘decision on issues,’ that is, spe-
cific state policies or legislative bills. Therefore, by the 
own nature of  the national referendum, the ‘confidence 
the public has in its representative’ cannot be a sub-
ject matter for a national referendum and the decision 
of  and the confidence in the representative under our 
Constitution may be performed and manifested solely 
through elections. The President’s attempt to reconfirm 
the public’s trust in him that was obtained through the 
past election in the form of  a referendum constitutes 
an unconstitutional use of  the institution of  a national 
referendum provided in Article 72 of  the Constitution 
in a way not permitted by the Constitution.
The Constitution does not permit the President to 
ask the public’s trust in him by way of  national refe-
rendum. The constitution further prohibits as an un-
constitutional act the act of  the President subjecting a 
specific policy to a referendum and linking the matter 
of  confidence thereto. Of  course, when the President 
institutes a referendum for a specific policy and fails to 
obtain the consent of  the public concerning the imple-
mentation of  such policy, the President may possibly 
resign by regarding such outcome as public’s distrust 
in him or her. However, should the President submit a 
policy matter to a referendum and declare at the same 
time that “I shall regard the outcome of  the referendum 
as a confidence vote,” this act will unduly influence the 
decision making of  the public and employ the referen-
dum as a means to indirectly ask confidence in the Pre-
sident, therefore will exceed the constitutional authority 
vested in the President. The Constitution does not vest 
in the President the authority to ask the confidence in 
him or her by the public through a national referendum, 
directly or indirectly.
(D) Furthermore, the Constitution does not permit 
a national confidence referendum in any other form 
than the national referendum that is expressly provided 
in the Constitution. This is also true even when a con-
fidence referendum is demanded by the people as the 
sovereign or implemented under the name of  the peo-
ple. The people directly exercise the state power by way 
of  the election and the national referendum, and the 
national referendum requires an express basis therefor 
within the Constitution as a means by which the people 
exercise the state power. Therefore, national referen-
dum cannot be grounded on such general constitutio-
nal principles as people’s sovereignty or democracy, and, 
instead, can only be permitted when there is a ground 
expressly provided in the Constitution.
(E) In conclusion, the President’s suggestion to hold 
a national referendum on whether he should remain in 
office is an unconstitutional exercise of  the President’s 
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authority to institute a national referendum delegated 
by Article 72 of  the Constitution, and thus it is in vio-
lation of  the constitutional obligation not to abuse the 
mechanism of  the national referendum as a political 
tool to fortify his own political position. Although the 
President merely suggested an unconstitutional national 
referendum for confidence vote and did not yet actually 
institute such referendum, the suggestion toward the 
public of  a confidence vote by way of  national refe-
rendum, which is not permitted under the Constitution, 
is itself  in violation of  Article 72 of  the Constitution 
and not in conformity with the President’s obligation to 
realize and protect the Constitution.
(4) Act of disregarding the opinion of the Natio-
nal Assembly
Pursuant to the acknowledged facts, the President 
disregarded the conclusion of  the National Assembly 
appointment hearing held on April 25, 2003 that Ko 
Young-gu was inappropriate for the position as the 
Director of  National Intelligence Service, and did not 
accept immediately the resolution of  removal by the 
National Assembly of  September 3, 2003 to dismiss the 
Minister of  Government Administration and Home 
Affairs.
(A) The President possesses the authority to appoint 
and remove the members of  the executive branch of  
the government under his or her direction and super-
vision (Article 78 of  the Constitution). Therefore, the 
appointment of  the head of  the Director of  National 
Intelligence Service is part of  the President’s exclusive 
authority and the President does not bear any obligation 
to accept the opinion concluded at the appointment 
hearing at the National Assembly. Thus, the President 
did not violate the Constitution by impeding upon the 
authority of  the National Assembly or infringing upon 
the constitutional doctrine of  separation of  powers, in 
disregarding the decision of  the National Assembly’s 
appointment hearing.
(B) Notwithstanding the authority of  the National 
Assembly to recommend removal of  the Prime Minis-
ter or other ministers of  the administration (Article 63 
of  the Constitution), such recommendation is a mere 
suggestion to remove such public official from office 
with no legally binding effect, and not the authority to 
determine the removal binding the President thereto. 
The meaning of  the ‘authority to recommend removal 
from office’ is that the President may be subject to an 
indirect check and control by holding politically respon-
sible the Prime Minister or other ministers of  the admi-
nistration serving the President’s administration, instead 
of  the President who may not be held politically res-
ponsible during the presidential term. An interpretation 
understanding the authority to recommend removal of  
certain public officials of  Article 63 of  the Constitution 
as the authority to determine removal of  such public 
officials does not conform to the constitutional provi-
sion itself, nor can such interpretation be harmonized 
with the current constitutional separation of  powers 
order that does not authorize the President to dissolve 
the National Assembly.
(C) In conclusion, the question of  whether the 
President accepts the conclusion reached at the Na-
tional Assembly appointment hearing or the National 
Assembly’s recommendation to remove a certain public 
official is a question of  political reverence towards the 
decision of  the National Assembly as the institution re-
presenting the public will, and not one of  a legal natu-
re. Therefore, the acts of  the President herein were the 
President’s legitimate exercise of  his authority within 
the separation of  powers structure under the Constitu-
tion, or were in conformity with constitutional norms, 
thus did not constitute acts in violation of  the Consti-
tution or statutes.
(5) Remark disparaging the National Assembly, 
etc.
(A) Pursuant to the acknowledged facts, the Pre-
sident in his open letter to the public via the Internet 
dated May 8, 2003 stated that “The farmer, when the 
time comes for weeding, roots out the weed from the 
field. ... certain politicians who fall to personal greed 
and interest and wrongful group selfishness ... certain 
politicians who disregard the will of  the majority of  
the public for reform and instead hamper such reform 
effort and harm the future of  the nation ....” (note that 
the President, unlike the allegation of  the impeaching 
petitioner, did not describe the then incumbent mem-
bers of  the National Assembly as the ‘weed to be roo-
ted out’) and described the movement at the National 
Assembly of  March 8, 2004 to impeach the President as 
‘unjust abuse of  power.’
The above statements fall within the definition of  
the expression of  opinion toward politics permitted to 
the President as the constitutional institution of  a po-
litical nature and, as such, were not in violation of  the 
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Constitution or statutes, apart from the possibility of  
such statements serving as the ground for political criti-
cism notwithstanding.
(B) Although the impeaching petitioner alleges that 
the President, in his ‘address commemorating the 85th 
anniversary of  the March 1st Independence Movement’ 
of  March 1, 2004, stated, concerning the move of  the 
U.S. military base out of  Yong-San, that “The symbol 
of  interference, invasion, and dependence will return 
to the bosom of  the citizens of  the Republic of  Korea 
as a true independent state,” such allegation was not in-
cluded in the original National Assembly impeachment 
resolution and is thus deemed to have been added sub-
sequent to the National Assembly’s resolution to im-
peach the President. Therefore, such allegation cannot 
properly be a subject matter in this impeachment adju-
dication.
D. Political power-based corruption involving 
the President’s intimate associates and aides
(1) Temporal scope of the proximity to the imple-
mentation of official duties
 Since Article 65(1) of  the Constitution limits the 
ground for impeachment as arising out of  the imple-
mentation of  ‘official duties’ in providing ‘the Presi-
dent, ... , in the performance of  the official duties,’ the 
interpretation of  the above provision urges that only 
certain acts violating the law committed while the Pre-
sident was in the office of  the President may constitu-
te the ground for impeachment. Therefore, even those 
acts committed by the President between the time of  
election and the time of  inauguration do not constitute 
the ground for impeachment. Although the legal status 
during this period as the ‘president-elect’ pursuant to 
the Act on Presidential Succession provides the presi-
dent-elect with certain authority to perform preparatory 
acts necessary for the succession of  the office of  the 
president, such status and authority of  the president-
-elect is fundamentally different from the official duties 
of  the President and an act violating the law committed 
during this period by the president-elect such as recei-
ving illegal political funds is subject to criminal prose-
cution. Therefore, there is no basis to adopt a different 
interpretation concerning the act of  violation commit-
ted during this period in terms of  the ground for im-
peachment under the Constitution.
(2) Reception of illegal political funds concer-
ning the Sun & Moon Group and the presidential 
election camp.
The alleged grounds for impeachment in this re-
gard arose out of  the facts that occurred prior to the 
respondent’s inauguration as the President on Fe-
bruary 25, 2003, and are thus clearly irrelevant to the 
respondent’s performance of  official duties as the 
President. Therefore, such alleged grounds are invalid 
without further reviewing the facts as to whether the 
respondent was involved in the reception of  such illegal 
funds.
(3) Corruption of the respondent’s intimate asso-
ciates and aides
Among the alleged grounds for impeachment in this 
regard, those based on the facts that occurred after the 
president’s inauguration as President are that Choi Do-
-sul received 47 million Korean Won from Samsung and 
others during his office as the General Affairs Secretary 
for the President, that Ahn Hee-jung received 1 billion 
Korean Won of  illegal fund from March through Au-
gust of  2003, and the allegations of  Yeo Taek-su and 
Yang Gil-seung.
However, none of  the evidence submitted throu-
ghout the proceedings in this case supports the allega-
tion that the respondent directed or abetted the above 
Choi Do-sul and others in receiving the illegal funds 
or was otherwise illegally involved therein. Therefore, 
the alleged grounds for impeachment premised on the 
above are meritless.
The rest of  the alleged grounds for impeachment are 
based on facts that occurred prior to the respondent’s 
inauguration as President and are thus clearly irrelevant 
to the respondent’s performance of  official duties as 
President. Therefore, such alleged grounds are invalid 
without further reviewing the facts as to whether the 
respondent was involved in the alleged reception of  il-
legal funds.
(4) Publicly declaring retirement from politics
Pursuant to the acknowledged fact, the respondent 
publicly declared, at the party representative meeting at 
Cheong Wa Dae on December 14, 2003, that the res-
pondent would retire from politics should the amount 
of  illegal political funds received by his election camp 
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exceed one-tenth of  that received by the Grand Natio-
nal Party at the time of  the presidential election.
However, such statement was made risking his poli-
tical trustworthiness facing a political situation and, as 
such, can hardly be deemed as a statement creating any 
legal obligation or responsibility. The question of  whe-
ther to keep such promise is merely a matter for politi-
cal and moral judgment and responsibility on the part 
of  the President as a politician and cannot constitute 
an act of  violating the Constitution or statutes in the 
President’s performance of  his official duties.
(5) Remark relating to the investigation by the 
prosecutors’ office
The alleged ground for impeachment contending 
that the respondent interfered with and obstructed the 
investigation by the prosecutors’ office by, for example, 
making a statement at the year-end luncheon at Cheong 
Wa Dae on December 30, 2003 that “I would have been 
able to twice grind up the prosecution had I meant to 
kill the prosecution, but I did not.” However, this al-
legation was not included in the National Assembly’s 
original impeachment resolution and is thus deemed to 
have been added subsequently, therefore it cannot be a 
subject matter in this impeachment adjudication.
E. Political chaos and economic collapse caused 
by unfaithful performance of official duties and 
reckless administration of state affairs
(1) The ground for impeachment in this regard is 
that the respondent, since his inauguration as President 
to date, has created extreme hardship and pain on the 
entire citizenry by breaking down the national economy 
and the state administration, allegedly caused by the 
President’s unfaithful performance of  official duties 
and reckless administration of  state affairs lacking any 
sincerity or consistency, such as the President’s repea-
tedly improper statements, expression of  an anti-war 
position following the declaration to dispatch military 
to Iraq, proposition of  an unconstitutional confidence 
referendum, and declaration to retire from politics, and 
unjust acts such as an illegal electoral campaign pou-
ring all his efforts into the general election prior to the 
permitted time period therefor. It is alleged that the res-
pondent thereby impeded the right to pursue happiness 
of  the public under Article 10 of  the Constitution and 
violated his ‘obligation to faithfully perform official du-
ties as president’ as expressly provided under Article 69 
of  the Constitution.
As various statistical indicators relating to the ‘eco-
nomic breakdown’ are presented in this case, although 
it is true that household debt increased, the unemploy-
ment rate among younger generations grew, and the 
state debt increased in the past year, it would be irra-
tional to hold the respondent entirely responsible for 
such economic aggravation. Also, there is no evidence 
in this case that would otherwise support a judgment 
that the economy of  the nation fell to an irrecovera-
ble state or that the administration of  state affairs was 
broken down.
(2) Article 69 of  the Constitution stipulates the ‘obli-
gation to faithfully perform the official duties’ as Presi-
dent while it provides for the oath of  office for the Pre-
sident. As stated previously, Article 69 is not a provision 
that merely obligates the President to take the oath of  
office, but is a provision that reemphasizes and specifies 
the obligation mandated by the Constitution in Articles 
66(2) and 66(3) for the office of  presidency by expres-
sively setting forth the content of  such oath of  office.
Although the ‘obligation to faithfully perform the 
official duties’ of  the President is a constitutional obli-
gation, this obligation, by its own nature, is, unlike the 
‘obligation to protect the Constitution,’ not the one the 
performance of  which can be normatively enforced. As 
such, as a matter of  principle, this obligation cannot 
be a subject matter for a judicial adjudication. Whether 
the President has faithfully performed his official duties 
may become the object of  the judgment by the public 
at the next regularly held election. However, under the 
current Constitution that limits the presidential term to 
a single term, there is no means to hold the President 
directly responsible, even politically, let alone legally, to-
ward the public and the President’s faithfulness or un-
faithfulness in performing his or her official duties may 
only be politically reflected favorably or unfavorably on 
the ruling party of  which the President is a member.
As Article 65(1) of  the Constitution limits the 
ground for impeachment to the ‘violation of  the Cons-
titution or statutes’ and the impeachment adjudication 
process at the Constitutional Court is solely to deter-
mine the existence or the nonexistence of  aground for 
impeachment from a legal standpoint, the ground for 
impeachment alleged by the petitioner in this case con-
cerning the respondent’s faithfulness of  the performan-
ce of  the official duties such as the political incapability 
or the mistake in policy decisions, cannot in and by itself  
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constitute a ground for impeachment and therefore it is 
not a subject matter for an impeachment adjudication.
F. Sub-conclusion
 (1) The President’s statements at the press confe-
rence with six news media organizations in the Seoul-
-Incheon region on February 18, 2004 and the state-
ments at the press conference with the Korean Network 
Reporters’ Club on February 24, 2004 were in violation 
of  the neutrality obligation owed by public officials pro-
vided in Article 9 of  the Public Officials Election Act.
(2) The act of  the President in response to the Na-
tional Election Commission’s March 4, 2004 decision 
that found a breach of  election law by the President was 
in violation of  the President’s obligation to protect the 
Constitution as not in conformity with the principle of  
the rule of  law. The act of  the President on October 13, 
2003 that proposed a confidence referendum violated 
the obligation to protect the Constitution as not in con-
formity with Article 72 of  the Constitution.
6. Whether to remove the respondent from office
A. Interpretation of Article 53(1) of the Constitu-
tional Court Act
Article 65(4) of  the Constitution provides that the 
“effect of  the decision of  impeachment is limited to 
the removal of  the public official from office,” and Ar-
ticle 53(1) of  the Constitutional Court Act provides that 
the “Constitutional Court shall issue a decision remo-
ving the public official from office when there is a valid 
ground for the petition for impeachment adjudication.” 
Here, the issue is how to interpret the phrase of  “when 
there is a valid ground for the petition for impeachment 
adjudication.”
One possible literal interpretation is that Article 
53(1) of  the Constitutional Court Act provides that the 
Constitutional Court shall automatically issue a decision 
removing the public official from office as long as there 
is any valid ground for impeachment set forth in Article 
65(1) of  the Constitution. However, under such inter-
pretation, the Constitutional Court is bound to order 
removal from public office upon finding any act of  the 
respondent in violation of  law without regard to the 
gravity of  illegality. Should the respondent be remo-
ved from his office for any and all miscellaneous vio-
lations of  law committed in the course of  performing 
his official duties, this would be against the principle 
of  proportionality that requests constitutional punish-
ment that corresponds to the responsibility given to 
the respondent. Therefore, the existence of  the ‘valid 
ground for the petition for impeachment adjudication’ 
in Article 53(1) of  the Constitutional Court Act means 
the existence of  a ‘grave’ violation of  law sufficient to 
justify removal of  a public official from his or her office 
and not merely any violation of  law.
B. Standard to be adopted in judging the ‘gravity 
of violations’
(1) The question of  whether there was a ‘grave viola-
tion of  law’or whether the ‘removal is justifiable’ cannot 
be conceived by itself. Thus, whether or not to remove a 
public official from office should be determined by ba-
lancing the ‘gravity of  the violation of  law’ by the public 
official against the ‘impact of  the decision to remove.’ 
As the essential nature of  the impeachment adjudica-
tion process lies in the protection and the preservation 
of  the Constitution, the ‘gravity of  the violation of  law’ 
means the ‘gravity in terms of  the protection of  the 
constitutional order.’ Therefore, the existence of  a valid 
ground for the petition for impeachment adjudication, 
that is, the removal from office, should be determined 
by balancing the ‘degree of  the negative impact on or 
the harm to the constitutional order caused by the viola-
tion of  law’ and the ‘effect to be caused by the removal 
of  the respondent from office.’
(2) The President is in an extremely significant status 
as the head of  the state and the chief  of  the execu-
tive branch (Article 66 of  the Constitution). Also, the 
President is an institution representing the public will 
directly vested with the democratic legitimacy in that 
the President is elected through a national election (Ar-
ticle 67 of  the Constitution). In these regards, there is a 
fundamental difference in political function and weight 
between the President and other public officials subject 
to impeachment. This difference is exhibited as a funda-
mental discrepancy in the ‘impact of  the removal.’
A decision to remove the President from office 
would deprive the ‘democratic legitimacy’ delegated to 
the President by the national constituents through an 
election during the term of  the office and may cause 
political chaos arising from the disruption of  the opi-
nions among the people, that is, the disruption and the 
antagonism between those who support the President 
and those who do not, let alone a national loss and an 
interruption in state affairs from the discontinuity of  
the performance of  presidential duties. Therefore, in 
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the case of  the President, the ‘directly delegated de-
mocratic legitimacy’ vested through a national election 
and the ‘public interest in continuity of  performance of  
presidential duties’ should be considered as important 
elements in determining whether to remove the Presi-
dent from office. Therefore in light of  the gravity of  
the effect to be caused by the removal of  the President 
from office, the ground to justify a decision of  removal 
should also possess corresponding gravity.
As a result, a grave violation of  law is required for 
a decision to remove the President from office that can 
overwhelmingly outweigh the extremely significant im-
pact of  such decision of  removal, whereas even a re-
latively minor violation of  law may justify the removal 
from office of  public officials other than the President 
as the impact of  removal is generally light.
(3) Although it is very difficult to provide in general 
terms which should constitute a ‘grave violation of  law 
sufficient to justify the removal of  the President from offi-
ce,’ that the impeachment adjudication process is a system 
designed to protect the Constitution from the abuse of  
public officials’ power on one hand and that the decision 
of  removal of  the President from office would depri-
ve the public’s trust vested in the President on the other 
hand, can be presented as important standards. That is, on 
one hand, from the standpoint that the impeachment ad-
judication process is a procedure ultimately dedicated to 
the protection of  the Constitution, a decision to remove 
the President from office may be justified only when the 
President’s act of  violating law has a significant meaning in 
terms of  the protection of  the Constitution to the extent 
that it is requested to protect the constitution and restore 
the impaired constitutional order by a decision of  removal. 
On the other hand, from the standpoint that the Presi-
dent is an institution representing the public’s will directly 
vested with democratic legitimacy through election, a valid 
ground for impeaching the President can be found only 
when the President has lost the public’s trust by the act of  
violation of  law to the extent that such public trust vested 
in the President should be forfeited while the presidential 
term still remains.
Specifically, the essential content of  the constitu-
tional order ultimately protected by the impeachment 
adjudication process, that is, the ‘basic order of  free 
democracy’ is constituted of  the basic elements of  
the principle of  government by the rule of  law whi-
ch are ‘respect for basic human rights, the separation 
of  powers, and the independence of  the judiciary,’ and 
of  the basic elements of  the principle of  democracy 
which include ‘the parliamentary system, the multi-par-
ty system, and the electoral system’ (2 KCCR 49, 64, 
89Hun-Ka113, April 2, 1990). Accordingly, a ‘violation 
of  law significant from the standpoint of  protection of  
the Constitution’ requiring the removal of  the President 
from office means an act threatening the basic order of  
free democracy that is an affirmative act against the fun-
damental principles constituting the principles of  the 
rule of  law and a democratic state. An ‘act of  betrayal 
of  the public’s trust’ is inclusive of  other patterns of  act 
than a ‘violation of  law significant from the standpoint 
of  protection of  the Constitution,’ and, as such, typi-
cal examples thereof  include bribery, corruption and an 
act manifestly prejudicing state interest, besides an act 
threatening the basic order of  free democracy.
Therefore, for example, in case of  the President’s act 
of  corruption by abuse of  power and status given by the 
Constitution such as bribery and embezzlement of  public 
funds, the President’s act manifestly prejudicing state inte-
rest despite the President’s obligation to implement public 
interest, the President’s act of  impeding upon the authority 
vested in other constitutional institutions such as the Na-
tional Assembly by abuse of  power, the President’s act of  
infringing upon the fundamental rights of  the public such 
as oppression of  the citizenry by way of  state organiza-
tions, or the President’s act of  an illegal electoral campaign 
or fabricating the election by using the state organizations 
in elections, it may be concluded that the President can 
no longer be entrusted to implement state affairs since the 
President has lost the trust of  the public that the Presi-
dent will protect the basic order of  free democracy and 
faithfully implement state administration.
In conclusion, a decision to remove the President 
from his or her office shall be justified in such limited 
circumstances as where the maintenance of  the presi-
dential office can no longer be permitted from the stan-
dpoint of  the protection of  the Constitution, or where 
the President has lost the qualifications to administrate 
state affairs by betraying the trust of  the people.
C. Whether to remove the President from office 
in this case
(1) Summary of the violation of law by the Pre-
sident
As confirmed above, the acts of  violation of  law by 
the President at issue in this case can be categorized 
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into the violation of  the ‘obligation to maintain neu-
trality’ concerning elections owed by public officials 
by making statements in support of  a particular poli-
tical party at press conferences, and the violation of  
the obligation to protect the Constitution owed by the 
President against the principle of  rule of  law and Arti-
cle 72 of  the Constitution by expressing unsatisfaction 
towards the National Election Commission’s decision 
that the President violated the election law and making 
statements denigrating the current election law and by 
proposing a confidence referendum.
(2) Gravity of the violation of law
(A) The President violated the ‘obligation to main-
tain neutrality concerning elections’ by making state-
ments supporting a particular political party, thereby 
infringing the constitutional request that the state insti-
tution should not affect the process through which the 
public freely forms the opinion or distort the competi-
tive relations among the political parties.
However, such acts by the President do not cons-
titute affirmative acts of  violation against the ‘parlia-
mentary system’ or ‘electoral system’ constituting basic 
order of  free democracy and, accordingly, it cannot be 
deemed that the negative impact of  the acts in violation 
of  the Public Officials Election Act upon the constitu-
tional order was grave, considering that the above acts 
of  violation of  the President were not committed in any 
affirmative, active or premeditated way by, for example, 
attempting to have administrative authority intervene 
through state organization. Instead, they took place in a 
way that was unaggressive, passive, and incidental, du-
ring the course of  expressing the president’s political 
belief  or policy design in the form of  a response to the 
question posed by the reporters at the press conference. 
It should also be considered that the boundary between 
the ‘expression of  opinion toward politics’ constitutio-
nally permissible for the President who is allowed to do 
political and party activities and the impermissible ‘acts 
of  violating neutrality obligation concerning elections’ 
is blurred and there has not been any established clear 
legal interpretation as to ‘in which circumstances it is 
beyond the scope of  political activities permitted for 
the President with respect to elections.’
(B) The President’s statement and act that causes 
suspicion to the President’s willingness to abide by law, 
even if  minor, may greatly affect the legal conscien-
tiousness and the observance of  the law of  the public. 
Thus, the President’s statement disrespectful of  the cur-
rent election law cannot be deemed as a minor violation 
of  law on the part of  the President who bears an obli-
gation to make all the efforts to respect and implement 
the law.
However, the statement of  the President denigrating 
the current election law as the ‘vestige of  the era of  go-
vernment-power- interfered election’ does not constitu-
te an affirmative violation of  the current law. Instead, 
such statement is an act of  violation of  law committed 
during the course of  reacting, in an unaggressive and 
passive way, towards the decision of  the National Elec-
tion Commission. The President, of  course, may well 
deserve criticism as such statement was an expression 
of  disrespectfulness toward the current law, therefore 
it was in violation of  the President’s obligation to pro-
tect the Constitution. However, considering the totality 
of  the specific circumstance where such statement was 
made, such statement was made with no affirmative in-
tent to stand against the basic order of  free democracy, 
nor was it an act of  grave violation of  law fundamen-
tally questioning the principle of  the rule of  law.
(C) The acts of  the President intending to seek sanc-
tuary in direct democracy through directly appealing to 
the public by proposing a confidence referendum in the 
state of  minority ruling party and majority opposing 
party rather than administering state affairs in confor-
mity with the spirit of  the presidential system and par-
liamentary system of  the Constitution, were not only 
in violation of  Article 72 of  the Constitution, but also 
against the principle of  the rule of  law.
Also, however, in this regard, the above acts of  the 
President did not constitute an affirmative violation of  
law against the fundamental rules of  the Constitution 
forming the principle of  democracy and accordingly, 
there was no grave negative impact upon the constitu-
tional order, considering that the President merely pro-
posed an unconstitutional confidence referendum and 
did not attempt to enforce such and that the interpre-
tation as to whether the ‘important policy concerning 
national security’ of  Article 72 of  the Constitution in-
cludes the issue of  confidence in the President has been 
subject to academic debates.
(3) Sub-conclusion
(A) To conclude, reviewing the totality of  the im-
pact the violation of  law by the President has upon the 
constitutional order, specific acts of  violation of  law by 
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the President cannot be deemed as a threat to the basic 
order of  free democracy since there was no affirmative 
intent to stand against the constitutional order therein.
Therefore, since the act of  violation of  law by the 
President does not have a significant meaning in ter-
ms of  the protection of  the Constitution to the extent 
that it is requested to protect the Constitution and res-
tore the impaired constitutional order by removing the 
President from office and, also, since such violation of  
law by the President cannot be deemed to evidence the 
betrayal of  public trust on the part of  the President to 
the extent that the public trust vested in the President 
should be deprived of  prior to the completion of  the 
remaining presidential term, there is no valid ground 
justifying removal of  the President from office.
(B) The power and political authority of  the Presi-
dent is vested by the Constitution and a president who 
disrespects the Constitution denies and destroys his or 
her own power and authority. Especially, the importan-
ce of  a resolute position of  the President to protect the 
Constitution cannot be emphasized enough in today’s 
situation where the constitutional awareness among the 
public has just begun to sprout in a brief  history of  de-
mocracy and the respect for the Constitution has yet to 
be firmly established in the consciousness of  the gene-
ral public. As the ‘symbolic existence of  the rule of  law 
and the observance of  law,’ the President should make 
the best effort in order to realize the rule of  law and 
ultimately protect the basic order of  free democracy by, 
not only respecting and abiding by the Constitution and 
statutes, but also taking a decisive stand toward uncons-
titutional or unlawful acts on the part of  other state ins-
titutions or the general public.
7. Conclusion
 A. The petition for impeachment adjudication is he-
reby rejected as the number of  the Justices required to 
remove the President from office under Article 23(2) 
of  the Constitutional Court Act has not been met. It is 
so ordered, pursuant to Articles 34(1) and 36(3) of  the 
Constitutional Court Act.
B. Article 34(1) of  the Constitutional Court Act pro-
vides that the deliberation at the Constitutional Court 
shall not be disclosed to the public, whereas the oral 
argument and the pronouncement of  the decision shall 
be disclosed. Here, non-disclosure of  the deliberation 
by the Constitutional Court Justices means that neither 
the separate opinions of  the individual Justices nor the 
numbers thereof  shall be disclosed, as well as the cour-
se of  the deliberation. Therefore, the opinions of  the 
individual Justices may be noted in the decision only 
when a special provision permits an exception to such 
secret deliberation procedure. While there is such spe-
cial provision permitting an exception to the secrecy of  
deliberation in Article 36(3) of  the Constitutional Court 
Act applicable to the proceedings of  constitutional re-
view of  a law, competency dispute among state institu-
tions, and constitutional petition, there is no provision 
permitting exception to the secrecy of  deliberation with 
respect to the impeachment adjudication. Therefore, in 
this impeachment adjudication, the separate opinions 
of  the individual Justices or the numbers thereof  may 
not be pronounced in the decision.
It should be noted that, concerning the above po-
sition, there was also a position that separate opinions 
may be pronounced and disclosed in the decision, in-
terpreting Article 34(1) of  the Constitutional Court Act 
as a provision merely providing for non-disclosure of  
the deliberative proceedings in that only the external 
proceeding or the content of  the opinions exchanged 
therein to reach the conclusion should not be disclosed 
and the final opinion of  the individual participating Jus-
tices reached through such deliberative process may be 
disclosed, and interpreting Article 36(3) of  the Consti-
tutional Court Act as a provision permitting disclosure 
of  separate opinions since such provision is based on 
the consideration to prevent the problem of  indiscrimi-
nately mandating disclosure of  separate opinions where 
it is improper to disclose separate opinions in impea-
chment adjudication or political party resolution pro-
ceeding, thus leaving the decision to disclose separate 
opinions in impeachment adjudication to the discretion 
of  the participating Justices.
Justices Yun Young-chul (Presiding Justice), Kim 
Young-il, Kwon Seong, Kim Hyo-jong, Kim Kyung-
-il, Song In-jun, Choo Sun-hoe(Assigned Justice), Jeon 
Hyo-sook, and Lee, Sang-kyung
